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There are many dimensions to the American abortion controversy,

although it is examined and understood most often as if there were but
one issue involved.

There have been few, if any, efforts to understand

the ideas and beliefs of all participants in the controversy, to explore
the possibility that beliefs about abortion are connected to other

political conflicts, and to suggest possibilities for compromise.
are the tasks

I

These

have set for myself in my dissertation.

In the first chapter,

I

suggest why the controversy must be

re-examined, arguing that the popularized version of pro-abortionism

incorrectly assumes that a majority of Americans supports abortion on
demand.

In fact, while many are not opposed to abortion in certain

instances, most oppose abortion merely at the discretion of the pregnant
woman.

The reasons for the opposition suggest that important questions

such as the status of the fetus and the limits of individual rights have
not been definitely answered.

Importantly, the Supreme Court's 1973

decisions, establishing abortion on demand, have been opposed by scientists, biologists, and philosophers as well as religious and lay people.

Those most opposed to abortion on demand, as a group, are the

working class.
of life.

I

In the second chapter,

I

explore and interpret this way

suggest that the ideal of the extended family is of such

great importance to working class people that they oppose any efforts

which could threaten or undermine that ideal.

Abortion on demand is one,

perhaps the most easily articulated, threat to the ideal.
In the third chapter,

set out and critique the popularized version

I

of pro-abortionism, arguing that it misinterprets the strength of its

supporters and the motives of most anti-abortionists, fails to deal with
the issues of contraceptive responsibility and fetal personhood; and as
a coincidence encourages many working class people to move to the Right.

In the fourth chapter,

I

offer a deeper critique of pro-abortionism,

relying on the work of Judith Thompson and Garrett Hardin.
the liberal vision upon which pro-abortionism ^rests

,

I

argue that

has an implicit

side which celebrates continuity, moral conviction and family stability,

though its explicit aspects are at odds with these, threatening to undermine the completely liberal society.
In the final chapter,

I

argue that there is an abstract case for

compromise and reasons for the participants in the abortion controversy
to try to achieve a morally acceptable political compromise.

The basis

would be the presumption of fetal personhood and the desire for family
stability.

The state would most likely be in the position of aiding

them; and trying
those who choose to abort, while officially discouraging

families are at their
to minimize its role in family life at a time when

VI

most dependent and the state's presence maximizes their dependence.

The

compromise is fraught with tensions and emphasizes the relatedness of the

abortion controversy to other political issues, though it seems as well
to hold the most promise for defusing the controversy and for suggesting

the dimensions of other political conflicts.
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CHAPTER

I

REASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF OUR ABORTION LAWS

In January 1973, when the Supreme Court legalized most abortions,

those who had worked for just such legalization assumed that the Justices'

support also signalled broad acceptance of the new law.

Most pro-

abortionists continue to hold this position publicly, though there are
good reasons for doubting that most Americans do indeed support abortion
on demand.

Judith Blake, a demographer at the University of California, has been

conducting research on American beliefs about abortion for over a decade.
She is arguing that although a majority of Americans do support abortion
in some instances, most Americans do not support abortion on demand

(abortion at the discretion of the mother or her doctor)

Blake argues that the major Supreme Court decisions on abortion
(Roe V. Wade and Doe v. Bolton)

beliefs.

are not all representative of public

Since 1952, it is true, there have been s\±)Stantial increases in

the number of Americans who say they would support abortions when the life

of the mother was endangered, and (to

a

lesser extent) when there is like-

lihood of the child being born seriously deformed.

It is true that in

1974 almost half the white population questioned in a Gallop Poll responded

that they would condone a woman's aborting an offspring she could not

afford to rear.

1

is
But what is most striking and most revealing about Blake's efforts

abortion on
the fact that only about 37% of those polled in 1974 supported

1

.

.

demand.

.

Most respondents made it clear that they supported
the availa-

bility of abortion in very limited circumstances.

What is more, those

with the lowest levels of income and education were least likely
to support
abortion for the reason that no more children are desired.

Only 26% of

those polled who had grade school educations or less favored abortion
for
this reason.
It is important to note,

too, that men and women with the lowest

levels of income and education were the most likely to consider the fetus
a person at conception,

although nearly half the respondents held this

view
Also, as late as 1975, 61% of those polled did not believe that
a woman should be allowed to have an abortion without the consent of her

spouse

Blake's findings suggest that liberal ass\amptions about widespread
support for current abortion laws are open to question.

The strong

probability that prominent pro-abortionists have misinterpreted the
strength and location of their supporters is important to explore because

many public policies are predicated on the assumption that most of the
populace supports the liberal reforms.
toward or preference for abortion as

a

And this has created a "tilt"
means of coping with unwanted and

problematic pregnancies.
Most insurance companies, for example, will reimburse unmarried

women for termination of their pregnancies, but offer them no maternity
coverage
Some leaders in the movement for abortion on demand have argued

that abortion has the potential for trimming substantially the budget

3

of the welfare state as it is less costly by far to subsidize
abortions
for the poor than it is to rear their children for eighteen
years.

Although this cost-benefit approach does not seem to be explicit
policy, many black leaders have complained about the pressure put on

black welfare recipients by their social workers not to carry their

pregnancies to term.

In some instances,

social workers threatened to

withhold welfare checks if the women did not go along with the abortions.^
There is also pressure on those who perform, or who are able poten-

tially to perform, abortions.

The Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare, for example, currently is investigating charges by applicants
to medical schools that admissions officers are refusing to accept appli-

cants who "stated refusal to participate in abortion and/or sterilization

procedures."

4

To date, several medical schools have acknowledged frankly that

this is their policy.

In such an intensely competitive situation as

trying to gain admittance to an American medical school, it is difficult
not to view the right to perform abortions as the obligation to perform
them.

This move from "right" to "obligation" is evident too in the advice

columns of most newspapers, where many present letters from women

pressured into abortions they did not really want.
her book The Ambivalence of Abortion

,

Linda Bird Franke

,

quotes Carol Downer, director of

the Feminist Women's Health Center in Los Angeles:
It's gotten to the point in some metropolitan communities
It's
that if you get pregnant, then you have an abortion.
there
then
And if you don't have the abortion,
that simple.
some
have
must be something wrong with you. You must really
And so most women go ahead and have them.
sort of complex.

in

Franke's book is filled with women, who, indeed, "went ahead and
had
them" despite the fact that they were ambivalent about or even opposed
to
the action.

The pressure, by spouses, boyfriends, parents, was strong;

and most found it difficult to find support for their desires to complete

their pregnancies.

Most still seemed very unsettled about their abortions.

Some continued to grieve for the children they aborted.
In a society where the impression is that abortion is almost

universally accepted as

a

method of dealing with unplanned pregnancies;

when that method has the additional qualities of being relatively quick,
safe, and inexpensive; and when the alternatives to abortion (financial

insecurity, the experience of being an unwed mother)

are not modified to

make child-rearing more of a choice, it is understandable that many women
see abortion as their only real option for troublesome pregnancies.

But if the impression of overwhelming support for abortion is false,
there is a substantial reason to re-think the American experience,

particularly, to re-examine the commonly held liberal assumptions about
the sources of opposition to our abortion laws.

Blake's work in partic-

ular puts considerable pressure on pro-abortionists who assume that

opposition to liberal abortion laws is generated for the most part by
right-wing Catholics and vengeful men.

6

But once doubt is cast on the premier assumption of most pro-

abortionists that elective abortion is widely supported, their position
as a whole deteriorates.

The remaining assimiptions

(concerning the rights

of the mother over her child, the oppositions' hatred of women, for
example)

are dependent, in large part, on broad support for their legi-

timacy.

pro-abort ionism,
If we cannot accept the popularized version of

5

we must identify who the anti-abortionists actually are
and explore the

beliefs which support their position.
In Chapter Two,
I

shall explore working class anti-abortionism.

I

have limited my explorations primarily to this group, because they
are

the most opposed to elective abortion, yet the least publicized.

The

actions of working class people have also been severely misinterpreted
by most pro-abortionists, and these misinterpretations are likely to

cause these people deep injury.

Finally,

I

have focused on these people

because the working class way of life suggests the limits of liberalism
more clearly than others do.
In this chapter,

I

shall try to deepen and extend the work begun

by Judith Blake on anti-abortionism and the working class.

For Blake

argues that, as with the population control policies, most liberals and

feminists have based their assiamptions about the needs and desires of

working class people on false assumptions.

They have assumed, for example,

that poor and working class parents want fewer children than they have;

•

have been unable to procure and use contraceptives effectively; would

welcome the opportunity to abort; and (in the case of women) would prefer
career opportunities other than motherhood.

7

Blake's findings are that working class and poor families have in
the past and continue to want larger families than do middle and upper

class parents.

She finds, too, that those who wish to limit their family

sizes have been able to obtain and use contraceptives effectively.

Blake argues that efforts by government agencies to encourage family

planning among these classes have met with some hostility as many members
government
resent and feel threatened by being so often the targets of

efforts at population control.

Blake argues that for these people, family roles
are the most

significant of those they play.
spouses, sons and daughters.

They see themselves first as parents,

Husbands work hard at dead-end jobs to

ensure the financial security of their families.

Wives resist the lure

of more exciting careers to ensure that the children are
raised strictly.

Even time is usually marked by the pregnancies, births, weddings
and
deaths of family members.
It is rational for such people to want to maintain the importance of

these roles given the paucity of alternatives.

And public policies which

put pressure on these roles are likely to be resisted by those at whom
they are aimed.

For the working class particularly, abortion as a method of birth

control poses a clear threat to family life.

Its easy availability and

the fact that many policymakers seem to prefer it as a method for dealing

with unexpected pregnancies makes abortion a particular threat to those

who are dependent or potentially dependent upon the state.
This threat to the ideal of working class family life is exacerbated
by the fact that the overwhelming number of women who obtain abortions
are unmarried and have no other children.

Thus abortion is considered

a means of preventing or eliminating family life.

Also, the working class

ideal of family life appears to be threatened by the Supreme Court's

decision that neither the spouse nor (in the case of an unmarried minor)
the parents must be consulted when a pregnant woman wants an abortion.
.

Many of the ideas and beliefs which have dominated the abortion

controversy reflect middle and upper class assumptions about work and
family life which working class people do not share.

Peter Skerry argues.

for example, that middle class and upper class men are more
likely to

have challenging careers which frequently take them away from
family
concerns; that these men are more likely to think of themselves,
to evaluate themselves, in terms of their occupational success or failure;
and

that their careers are more likely to spill over into their "family
time

"

8

.

These men are more likely than working class counterparts to have

severed or loosened ties with relatives, as their professional success
is often contingent upon their willingness to relocate.

Their wives are

more likely to have the educational background, leisure and financial
resources to explore careers other than child-rearing.

Their children

are more likely to spend their leisure time outside the home and immediate

neighborhood.

The family unit has less of an exclusive claim on the

physical and emotional resources of its members.
This is in sharp contrast to the situation of working class men
for whom the family has become an important escape from what is often
a routine and undignified work life.

The family, if anything, has

increased in significance for these men.

Children are reared in tight

rein
On one level,

I

shall argue, the abortion controversy is as heated

as it is because it crystalizes a conflict of ways of life and because

that conflict has not yet been fully, or even substantially, understood.
In the third chapter,

I

shall set out the popular version of pro-

abortionism to suggest ways in which it is based on misinterpretations of
the working class way of life; and to suggest other basic

problems with

for
the position which could, if confronted, suggest possibilities

compromise with the anti-abortionists.

On another level, the abortion controversy suggests the
poverty of
the liberalism which spawned most pro-abortionism.

shall focus on two prominent pro-abortionists

and Garrett Hardin

-

-

In Chapter Four

I

Judith Harvis Thompson

to show how their pro-abortionism has an implicit

side which can undermine the attainment of the liberal vision which

inspires them.

The implicit side requires the traditional social arrange-

ments which their explicit social programs disturb.

It is unrecognized

in part because of their claims to political neutrality and, in part

because their liberalism encourages an abstract individualist view of
the world which cannot capture important aspects of social life.

On one level, the abortion controversy is impelled by misinterpre-

tations and on another by a vision which is only partially understood.
In my concluding chapter,

resolving the controversy.

I

I

shall explore the prospects for

shall argue that there is an abstract

case to be made for the morally informed political compromise, and that
in important ways, there is such a case to be made for our abortion

controversy.

Although such a compromise would not be the ideal most

participants would prefer, there are grounds for a compromise and some
reason to expect that each side could, on reflection, acknowledge at
least the minimal amount of legitimacy to each way of life which would

promote a spirit of compromise.
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CHAPTER

II

ANTI-ABORTIONISM AND THE WORKING CLASS
IDEAL OF FAMILY LIFE - AN INTERPRETATION

^-

The Interpretive Method

In this chapter,

anti-abortionism.

I

- A

Defense and Explanation

shall offer an interpretation of working class

My analysis is intended, in part, as an instantiation

of the interpretive method of social inquiry.

My research on working

class women is based, in substantial part, upon dialogues
them,

I

have had with

the dialogue being the appropriate method for the interpretive mode.

But since the appropriateness of particular models of explanation is widely contested in the social sciences, my choice of the interpretive method

requires some defense.
The goal of strict behavioral science is to construct a science of

man equal to the presumed objectivity of the natural sciences.

Such a

science would include a range of concepts which would be used by any

trained observer to explain human behavior.

Its proponents assume that

human action can be captured in such an objective vocabulary.

But the

model explanation has been criticized from many perspectives.
Thomas Kuhn, for example, argues in The Structure of Scientific

Explanation that even the natural sciences cannot lay claim to the
neutrality its proponents claim for the behavioral sciences.

Natural

scientists work within paradigms which establish the parameters of
research, indeed, what is to count as a

fact."'"

The critics of the behavioral method in the social sciences argue

that social reality is not objective, as many behavioralists assume,
10
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but is shaped, in part, by the ideas and
beliefs the participants have of
themselves.

And these ideas and beliefs are embedded in
social practices,

roles, and institutions.

Peter Winch, in The Idea of A Social Science

,

argues that most of

our experiences are possible because we have a vocabulary
in which to

express them; and in this respect most of our experiences would be
impossible outside social life.

The emotions of love, grief, trust,

resentment, for example, presuppose the existence of others who under-

stand the intentions and beliefs which are embedded in those concepts and

who are capable, therefore, of responding at the level suggested by those
intentions and beliefs.
Some of our experiences, moreover, are possible only within a

particular form of life.

A participant in an exchange of goods could not

characterize herself as having accrued a "profit" if she were not a participant in a form of life which marked this distinction and the corres-

ponding ones of a capitalist economy.

Neither could a shepherd of old

have characterized himself as a "conspicuous consumer" nor his sheep
"bad investment."

a

The form of life in which he was implicated lacked

such vocabulary, hence the possibility for him to identify himself and

his sheep in this way:

the ideas and beliefs appropriate to these charac-

terizations were not available for the having.
On this view, social explanation must begin with an understanding
of the ideas and beliefs which the participants have of themselves, for,
to repeat,

are.

it is these which constitute an important part of what they

This understanding precludes the type of objectivity required by

strict behaviorists because the observer must, to some extent at least.

.
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immerse herself in the way of life and identify with it.

It is

unavoidable
Now,

it may be that the self-understandings of the participants,

even if they are understood perfectly by the observer, will be distorted
or incomplete.

The social scientist, after understanding the ideas and

beliefs of the participants in a way of life, might offer an interpretation of it which is at odds with that which the participants themselves would give.

Though the social scientist is building on the self-understandings
of those whose actions she is trying to explain, when she goes beyond
these, she is relying, implicitly, or explicitly, on a philosophical

anthropology, a theory of man to support her interpretation.

The

philosophical anthropology is built into the explanatory framework and
cannot be severed from it.

It is because of the partial self-constitution

of social reality and the absolute dependence of social explanation on a

philosophical anthropology which cannot be proven objectively, "that
neutrality cannot be a goal of the social sciences.
For as Charles Taylor argues in Interpretation and the Sciences of
Man, social explanation is reflexive

.

The social scientist argues that

men are brutish, nasty and selfish, for example, and this interpretation
helps to shape her beliefs about others and, probably, their response to
her.

The speculation helps to shape social reality.
It is the reflexive nature of social explanation which is responsible

social
for the "hermeneutical circle" characteristic of interpretive

science.

Interpreters are engaged in "readings" of social ideas, beliefs,

meanings, and if the readings are not acceptable to other social

13

scientists, the explanation of social action will not make sense either.
The only recourse in this predicament is to try to persuade those who do
not "see" with more readings.

There is nowhere else the argument can go;

though Taylor insists that working within the interpretive circle, it is
not inappropriate to ask social scientists to "change themselves," which
is precisely what seems necessary if we are to come to grips with social

theories at odds with our own.
There is here no "knock-down" evidence which will prove a theory
true and which will be acceptable to all involved in the enterprise.
All explanations, all interpretations, are subject to claims of "distorted

consciousness" by those who have different readings of social meanings.
Some of the implications which flow from this model of social expla-

nation are unnerving; and

I

suspect that this has encouraged many social

scientists to doubt that there are any reasons for choosing one theoretical framework over another.

But there are some tests which can help

establish the validity of an explanation.

We can be legitimately

suspicious of an explanation, for example, which is built on a view of

human relationships which the explainee, in her ordinary life, rejects.
And we can be suspicious of explanations of social life which the

participants, on reflection, reject as inadequate characterizations
of their social life.

But our clearest explanations will always be

those which give us some perspective; hence our most profound social

explanations will be historical explanations.

.
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Interpreting Working Class Anti-abortionism

2.

The dialogue form is the most appropriate mode for interpreting
a

way of life.

Ideally, it can help the interpreter understand a way of

life and also accommodate the reflexive nature of interpretation, by

allowing both the interpreter and the participants to change the direction
of the discourse when, perhaps, the dialogue suggests new understandings
for everyone involved.

For my research,

women with whom

I

began speaking with women suggested to me by

I

work (at

a

part-time position in a supermarket)

.

These

women, in turn, suggested others who might be interested in speaking with
me.

In all,

I

spoke with twelve women.

In each instance,

I

spoke with the women in their own homes, held

two conversations with each, for a total of about

with each woman.

In every instance,

to lunch; and in every instance,

recorded on tape

- a

I

I

5

hours spent talking

was treated hospitably and invited

accepted.

The conversations were

fact which made the women self-conscious only for

a few minutes
I

have tried to show the inner rationality of the working class way

of life, so that

I

can build upon it to suggest how it has been misin-

terpreted by pro-abortionists; how it is at odds with important aspects
of liberal society; and how liberalism ultimately is dependent for its

success on aspects of working class life.
The validity of my interpretation is dependent, in part, on the

extent to which it explains better than others have, the reasons for

working class anti-abortionism.

And the validity is established, in

evidence we
part, by the compatibility of my interpretation with other

15

have about the working class way of life.
I

consider the project important for two reasons.

First, as

I

have

already suggested, there is recent evidence which suggests that most

members of the working class are opposed to abortion on demand."^
^^^-i^P3l--??.y°P

..•^^'--'-^

The

conducted by Judith Blake during the last decade

revealed that 70% of those with grade school education (51% of those
with high school educations)

,

and 62% of those living on incomes of

$7,000 or less, were opposed to legalization of abortion during any

time after conception.^
This contrasts sharply with the beliefs of those with college

educations, of whom 87% approved of legalization of first trimester
abortions.

Of those with incomes of $20,000, or more, 62% approved.

Education and income levels seem to offer the greatest indication
of beliefs about abortion on demand, the personhood of the fetus, and
the rights of all involved in the decision to abort.

Even religious

beliefs, which are most commonly claimed to be the determinant of

beliefs about abortion, are not so revealing as are the educational and
income levels of the respondents.

The beliefs of Catholics and

Protestants, for example, were about the same with respect to beliefs
about legalization of abortion when the mother has been raped, when her

health is endangered by the fetus, when the fetus might be born with a
congenital defect, when there is no desire to have another child, and

when the mother believes she cannot afford to rear another child.

6

There is, then, suggestive evidence that the abortion controversy

may harbor

a class conflict.

largely unexplored.

This possibility, though, has been

16

The leaders of the Right-to-Li f e movement, for example, assume that

their support comes from those who wish to protect the lives of the unbor:

Their interpretation of their increasing strength does not generally
include the possibility that there may be other reasons why supporters

might oppose liberal abortion laws.
And most feminists and family planners assume either that working
class people support abortion on demand, or that the broad opposition to

abortion which did exist is vanishing as members come to see that their

beliefs about strict abortion laws were irrational.
These positions by the principal participants in the abortion con-

troversy have encouraged a closing-out of consideration of working class

opposition to abortion on demand.

And the second reason for my pursuing

another interpretation of working class anti-abortionism is to suggest
that such a closing-out increased, perhaps unwittingly, the burdens the

members of this class already carry.
In this chapter,

I

shall build on the recent evidence of working

class opposition to abortion, interpreting and filling out what such

research only suggests exists.
My interpretation is based on several sources.

The first is recent

interpretations of working class life, particularly Lillian Rubin's

Worlds of Pain and Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb's The Hidden
Injuries of Class

.

These studies suggest that while there has been a

significant democratization of the American way of life, substantial

inequalities remain which encourage different ways of life, indeed,

different self-understandings among members of different classes.
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My second source is the set of in depth conversations

working class women.

I

had with

My purpose in conducting these conversations was

to substantiate and bolster the work of Rubin, Sennett, and Cobb and
to delve specifically into beliefs about abortion.

My final source is

my own experience with working class people, which comes from a part-

time job

I

hold in a supermarket, the neighborhood

I

live in currently,

and my own background as a member of a working class family in a working

class community.
I

shall draw on and elaborate upon these sources to show that

working class opposition to abortion can be understood best by seeing
how these beliefs are connected to others which celebrate family life,

generational ties, respect for life.

These beliefs reflect a set of

commitments, often not articulated, which underpin an ideal way of life
and a particular self-understanding and self-dignity.
These beliefs and commitments distinguish members of this class

from members of other classes, where we cannot expect to find different
ideals of family, work, neighborhood life.

What is more, the actual upholding of this shared ideal within the
class itself differs - a circumstance which can help explain both the

intensity of working class opposition to abortion and the fact that some

working class women do have abortions.
For the ideal of nurturance and self-sacrifice for the extended

family is held by most working class people and it is against this ideal
that members assess their conduct and measure their self-esteem.
the actual
In my own research, the coherence between the ideal and

conduct of the working class women with whom

I

spoke seemed to be quite

.
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high.

They believed, for example, that they had certain obligations to

their elderly parents, and, indeed, they did take their parents in with

them when they could no longer fend for themselves
I

suspect that such a strong coherence can be attributed, sub-

stantially, to several circumstances.

The families

I

was involved with

were firmly rooted in specific neighborhoods and communities; they had
no plans or pressing reasons

(such as lack of jobs)

to move elsewhere.

This lack of mobility produced a stability which seemed to facilitate
the logistics of caring for extended family members.

It encouraged, as

well, a great degree of predictability about relationships and expectations.

Members could know with reasonable certainty, for example, who

would be out of work when, who would be responsible for the care of
certain aunts and uncles, etc.
All of the families with whom

I

was involved had strong ethnic

traditions and religious commitments to draw on which were compatible

with the working class ideal of family life.

All of these circumstances

promote a broad identification with special commitments and obligations
to the extended family as well as the impetus to fulfill them.
It seems clear, though, that even though most working class people

do identify with these obligations and commitments, not all of them live
up to them.

marriages.

In 1976,

for example, there was one divorce for every two

The divorce rate has increased by 127% from 1962-1976.

7

And the working class people are just as likely to divorce as are

members of other classes.

8

50,000
The United States Children's Bureau estimates that between

States every
and 75,000 incidents of child abuse occur in the United
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year.^
I

This,

too,

seems to cut across class lines.

''"^

shall suggest that though the ideal of working class family life

is embraced and defended by a majority of members,

not all members live

up to the obligations and commitments which are the basis of this ideal.

With respect to abortion, liberal abortion laws are perceived by

most members of this class as a threat to the ideal itself.

And because

the ideal and the self-identification with it are linked so intimately,

liberal abortion laws also threaten the self-identity of most working
class people.

We can expect members of this class who both hold and largely live
up to the ideal of family life to oppose such laws.

And

I

want to argue

that we can also expect strong opposition from members of this class who

identify with the ideal but who do not always, or even largely, live up
to the obligations and commitments which are its basis.

Indeed, some-

times their public celebration of the ideal and public opposition to

abortion is stronger than other members of their class.

Their sense

of self is just as, if not more, threatened by liberal abortion laws
than the others
Finally, there are those members of the working class who do not

oppose liberal abortion laws

-

those,

I

would suggest, for whom the

ideal of family life has no or little meaning.

Though recent evidence

suggests that this group is a small minority, it does exist.

I

shall

suggest that the circumstances which promote identification with the
ideal of working class family life others share are missing or diminishing
the
for these people, thus lessening the likelihood that an attack on

ideal would prove a strong response from them.
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I

hope, then, to deepen recent interpretations of working class

anti-abortionism first, by illuminating the way the working class
ideal of family life is threatened by liberal abortion laws; second, by

suggesting that opponents of abortion include those members of the class
who identify with the ideal, though they do not necessarily uphold it

privately (thus explaining why members of this class divorce, abuse
family members, get abortions, while publicly, often vociferously

rejecting all of these)

;

and third, to suggest that where conditions

compatible with this ideal are eroding, we can expect working class
people to lean more in support of liberal abortion laws than they would
in more nurturing circumstances.
I

shall begin, then with a consideration of the ideal of working

class life.
The importance of the family to members of the working class is

Consider

evident in almost every aspect of working class experience.
this account of a typical day of one of the women with whom

I

held

several conversations:
get up around 6:30 and make breakfast for me and Wade
I get Brandy (her daughter) up and get
(her husband)
her dressed. We drop her off at my mother's or at one of
my sisters' and then we go to work. After work, we
usually pick up some groceries and then we get Brandy.
We might stay awhile and talk. Then, I make supper while
Wade and Brandy watch T.V.
I

.

After dinner, I clean up, maybe do some housework, watch
some T.V. until Brandy settles down. Or maybe my father
comes for a visit or we go to see him and my mother.
don't work. Brandy sleeps a little longer, I do more
housework; maybe I go to my mother's to do the wash. Somethere's
times, we'll go some place on Sunday; or sometimes
we do.
what
is
this
mostly
time for one of my projects; but
Nothing special.
If

I
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It is very common for working class people to live
close to their

parents and other relatives.

Often, they live within the same house or

on the same street; almost always they live in the same town.

And it is generally the extended family that provides its members

with most of their social contacts.

Members generally visit one another

frequently, exchange news, discuss- family problems, perhaps watch tele-

vision or play cards together.

Extended family members generally act

as babysitters for one another for infrequent nights out, or, more

usually, when the mother must work.
In my research and experience, it was not at all unusual to find

mothers and married daughters and sisters who regularly shopped together
for food, clothing, appliances.

Neither was it uncommon to find members

borrowing money, food, clothes, cars, or tools from one another.
Most accounts of typical days are filled with activities shared

with or accomplished for extended family members.

There are calls to

mothers and sisters; errands run with or for other family members; visits
with ailing or elderly parents, grandparents, aunts and uncles.
the primary concerns are family concerns:
a brother's trouble with the police,

So,

a sister's shaky marriage,

a husband's desire for a more

organized household.
Says Lillian Rubin:
Generally, it is the relationships with extended family
parents, and siblings - that are at the heart of working
class social life... These are the people who are seen most
often and most regularly, whose lives are shared both
emotionally and socially. These are the people with whom
intimacies are maintained - who can be trusted with the
care of young children on the rare occasion when a couple
takes an evening out alone, perhaps to celebrate a birth-

day or an anniversary.-'--'-

too,
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Working class men and women might have friends with whom they talk
at work, neighbors with whom they keep up occasionally, or (particularly
for the women)

old friends they call or visit once in

a while.

For the

most part, though, the bulk of their leisure time is spent at home, with
spouse and children, or with members of the extended family.

How has the extended family come to play such an important role in

working life
classes?

-

a role

apparently it does not play for members of other

Lillian Rubin argues that the family has a different, increased

significance for working class people because the institutions which

generally compete with it for self-absorption are fairly closed off to
members of this class.

The most dramatic example of this is the insti-

tution of work.

A typical working class job requires little skill and training, is
highly insecure and tedious.
minimal.

Challenge, skill and companionship are

In short, the job requires and generally receives very little

absorption of the worker.

It is unusual to find a worker who identifies

with his job in the way a professional would.

Instead, the meaningful

aspect of such working lives are found outside the place of work.

Says

"...the job's just

one of the workers Sennett and Cobb interviewed:

cash to live; the things that matter every day to me are at home... the
family, people in the neighborhood."

12

The family becomes a retreat for working class men.

my co-workers:
I

come home;

I

Says one of

"My family and my work life are like two different worlds,

shut the door; I'm with my kids.

I

live for them."

and
working class men turn to the family for the sense of dignity

purpose difficult to find in their work lives.
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Sennett and Cobb argue that the primary source of self-respect for

most workers is the "ideology of sacrifice" members make for their
families.
a society

They argue that those at the bottom of the job ladder, in

which professes equality of opportunity as

a goal,

must either

acknowledge that this goal has not been reached and they are its victims,
or recognize that they deserve their bottom-rung position because the

system is working and they are its least able or motivated members.
There is strong evidence to suggest that the system is not working
as conceived.

Inequalities in income, for example, have not leveled

off in the last few decades.

13

There is a connection between income

level and occupation which illuminates other inequalities.

Those in

professional and white collar occupations are more likely than those in
blue collar jobs to receive benefits in addition to salary.
They are apt to have more comprehensive health insurance, sick pay
and disability benefits; they are likely to have more liberal vacation

benefits, increased job security and retirement funds.

Also, there is

generally more job responsibility and autonomy in salaried occupations.
And finally, there is a tight connection between the income level
of one's parents and one's educational progress.

14

Such inequalities intertwine and encourage stability in the system.
Thus, working class children are likely to have the same or similar goals

and ways of life as their parents.

Sennett and Cobb argue that while many of the working class men
system of
they interviewed acknowledged in the abstract that the
personal
equality of opportunity is not working fairly, most, on a
level, blame themselves for their fate.

Their low-level positions are
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experienced as personal failures rather than public injustices.
Nearly every worker with whom Sennett and Cobb spoke said at some
point:

"If only

I

had what it takes, things would have been different.""'"^

Or,

Look, I know it's nobody's fault but mine that I got
stuck here where I am, I mean... if I wasn't such a
dumb shit... no, it ain't that neither... if I'd applied
myself, I know I got it in me to be different, can't
say anyone did it to me.-'-^
Or,

really didn't have it upstairs to do satisfying work,
if you know that I mean... I just wasn't smart enough
''^
to avoid hauling garbage

I

.

These workers salvage, or shape, a sense of self-respect from their
jobs by viewing their labor as a sacrifice made for their families.

Work

has meaning because it is being done for others, for the family, so that

they can have the homes, vacations, financial security a husband and
father is supposed to provide.
The self-respect flows from the fact that the working class man

considers his sacrifice freely chosen.

He has made a choice to

sacrifice his energy, time, perhaps his good health, for his family.

What is more, without his sacrifice, the members of his family could not
maintain dignity themselves

.

They would be forced to collect welfare,

a humiliating experience for most working class people.

The ideology of sacrifice extends well beyond the provision of the

family's material needs.

Working class fathers also speak of sacri-

ficing their free time for their kids, so they'll "learn the right

values."

For most men, working tedious jobs with plenty of overtime

sacrifice.
makes spending leisure time with their children an enormous
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Usually, the ideology extends to one's parents and one's parentsin-law, particularly when these folks grow older.

Although most working

class children could not afford to institutionalize their aging parents

even if they wished this, most would never consider doing so.

belief that one is responsible for one's family members is

a

The

commitment

deeply rooted in working class life, one which is emphasized and made
more freely chosen by the ideology of sacrifice.
This sense of familial obligation apparently is not so strong in

members of the other classes.
striking.

Lillian Rubin found the difference quite

When asked to fantasize about what they'd do if they

inherited one million dollars, 34% of the working class people she inter-

viewed said they would help members of their extended families, while only
one professional said this

-

and he was the only professional interviewed

from a working class background.

18

Rubin speculates that members of the other classes do not need

usually to consider the financial well-being of their parents, as their
parents are generally financially secure.
their children.

Indeed, they often help out

But this explanation risks the assumption that if only

working class children had such resources, they would, say, institutionalize their parents when they were no longer capable of living alone.

But when this subject came up with some of the working class women

with whom
that.
us.

I

I

spoke, their responses were, in general:

could never put my parents in a nursing home.

"I could never do

They belong with

They'd be so hurt if we put them in a place like that.

And, after

right?"
all, children are supposed to take care of their parents,

members is
The belief that one's parents belong with other family
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much like the belief

I

heard stated many times that one's children did

not belong in nursery school.

my kids.

Besides,

I

"I don't

want strangers looking out for

mean, unless they're really desperate for money, and

she has no family, the wife should be able to take care of the kids

herself."

These commitments to maintain the closeness of the family

usually require some sacrificing by the members.

Consider two accounts

that came up in some of my conversations.
In the first, the woman's father had died over a year before.

One

of the woman's sisters immediately moved in with the widowed mother,

bringing along her own husband and three children.

Another sister

bought the first home in the mother's neighborhood that became available,

honoring the mother's wish to stay put.

All of the woman's children

live in the same town and take turns running errands for her, keeping

her company and assisting her through her period of grief.
There was no hesitation, apparently, by any family members about

making such arrangements, though this is a drain on all of them,

I

am

told.
In another family, the grandmother "visits" each of her four

children a few weeks at a time.

She has long since sold her house.

Her visits are an emotional and physical drain on the families as the

woman is unable to get around much by herself and is disoriented
occasionally.

She eats heartily, is enormous in size, and generally

breaks the slats on the bed she sleeps in.

There is no consideration by

though she is
any of her children to institutionalize the woman, even

eligible, through welfare, for some such care.
it were.
Such gentle treatment of their aged members comes, as
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naturally, to many working class families.

The relationships in the

family are built on loyalty to members (to almost all extents)

gentle

;

and personal treatment of the elderly and dependent; stability in

marriage, exclusive care and rearing of the children.
This does not mean that these obligations are never experienced as

burdensome, or even as posing extreme hardships upon family members.

By

and large, though, these obligations are accepted without question, if
not without complaint, about burdens which they often impose.

Neither does this mean that no one is ever mistreated in
class family.

a

working

Instances of child, spouse, and parent abuse are

increasing, and the abuse does not seem to be class-specific.
The important point is that such treatment of the elderly and

other members of the extended family is part of the ideal by which most

working class people assess their conduct.

It is something with which

they strongly identify, and would defend publicly, even though, for

various reasons, not all members are always or even largely living up to
the obligations and commitments inherent in the ideal.

Joseph Howell, in Hard Living on Clay Street
at least two types of working class families:

"settled" livers.

,

argues that there are

the "hard" and the

The "settled" families are those who not only identify

with the image of family life as close-knit and demanding but also, for
the most part, live up to requirements of this ideal.

The "hard" livers

and can be
are those who, though they strongly identify with the image
abide by
expected to defend the way of life to others, do not actually
its requirements.

Howell suggests that members of both types can be

differences emphasize
considered members of the same class, though their
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that there are tensions within the class itself."""^

Lillian Rubin, too, noted in her analysis of a working class

community that many of the couples she interviewed had an ideal of
family life before them which they used to evaluate their own actions.
She suggests that not all of the couples with whom she spoke seemed to
be living up to the image, though they were careful to present themselves
as though they were, and to fend off any challenges she would make to

the image itself.
It is likely,

then, that even though most working class people

identify with a vision of family life which exacts long-term commitments and sacrifice from its members, not all members will actually, for

various reasons, live up to those commitments.

The important point is

that their self- identifications with the roles, expectations, the entire

way of life, are so firmly rooted, that threats to the image of family
life, whether or not all members are actually faithful to it, are likely
to be firmly challenged

.

The potential loss of bearings, loss of self,

just as, if not more, threatening to those members of the working class

who cling to but do not always uphold the image of family life, as it is
to those who largely do.

An in depth understanding of the way of life can help us to under-

stand how some liberal reforms, particularly liberal abortion laws,
threaten the very basis of that way of life.

The understanding is

deepened when we see how there are conflicts within the class itself
over those who do and do not live up to shared expectations, and when
we see how the self-identifications, nevertheless, are shared by most,
though not all members.

i
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Now the ideology of sacrifice, to continue to flesh out the ideal,
is assumed,

almost exclusively, for the benefit of family members.

It is

assumed, moreover, not only by the male breadwinner, but by all family

members
The wife is supposed to make do, not complain too much, assume as

much of the extended family obligations as she can.

Children are

expected to help out around the house, behave in school and around the
neighborhood, and assist their grandparents when asked.

Underlying the ideology of sacrifices are commitments that help to

keep the extended family intact:

hard work, support, willingness to fore-

go immediate pleasure for the needs of others.

These commitments, though, are generally rather tacit, not

implicitly embraced or even realized.

expressed in such statements as:
"I could never put my parents

This seems evident in the shock

"I could never go on welfare," or

(or grandparents)

in a place like that,"

or "I could never send my kids to nursery school."

It was as if they

were asked, for the first time, to consider the unconsiderable
The ideology of sacrifice adds an element of choice to these

commitments, and, most importantly, and as a consequence, a degree of

self-respect to the sacrifices.

There are others, after all, who do not

provide for their families; who would put their parents away; who don't
care if their youngsters are properly raised; who complain about their

husbands' abilities as providers.

They could do these things too; but

they choose not to be like these others.
selfSennett and Cobb argue that the ideology of sacrifice and the

several
respect which flows from it are fragile and threatened from
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directions.

Welfare recipients pose a threat, for example, because
they

suggest that the man's family would be provided for even
without his
working.

Much of the resentment toward welfare programs and the

recipients themselves, which seems to be characteristic of working
class
men, may be understood as a defense of the limited measure of self-respect

staying off welfare allows them.

Consider these conversation fragments recorded by Sennett and
Cobb about welfare recipients:
I work for my money.
My job is to work for my family.
They don't want to work, they live for nothing but kicks,
nothing but good booze and good sex.

What kills me are these people that are on welfare and
things like that - or like these colored people that are
always squakin'
Yet they don't wanta work.
I go out.
I
work sometimes nine, ten days in a row.
I got five
children.
That's what burns me, when somebody else - like
the woman on the street here that collects welfare.
She's
a phony, but she can still collect it.
She takes a cab
back and forth and we pay for it.^*^
.

Most will acknowledge that some recipients of welfare are not frauds
They agree, as well, that

and could not survive without some assistance.

they have an obligation to assist these needy with their taxes.

these men would not consider going on welfare themselves.

Yet

Such an act

would undermine the sacrifice they are making for their families as well
as the dignity which comes from making the sacrifices.

The ideology of sacrifice common to working class men is also

threatened by working class wives who want to go back to work.

According to Lillian Rubin, 58% of working class women work outside
.

.

the home, most of them in part-time positions.
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This often, though certainly not always, poses a threat to their
the
husbands, because if their wives have to work, it is a signal that
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men are failing, as least to some extent to provide for their
families'
support.

Consider the response of a working class husband Rubin interviewed
on the subject of his wife working.

She just doesn't know how to be a real wife, you know,
feminine and really womanly. She doesn't know how to give
respect because she's too independent. She feels that
she's a working woman and she puts in almost as many hours
as I do and brings home a paycheck, so there's no one
person above the other. She doesn't want there to be a
king in this household.
I'd like to feel like I wear the pants in this family.
Once my decision is made, it should be made and that's it.
She should just carry it out.
But it doesn't work that
way around here. Because she's working and making money,
she thinks she can argue back whenever she feels like it.^^

The husband's sacrifice is enhanced when his wife is fully dependent
It is not automatically undermined if the wife works, partic-

upon him.

ularly if she works only part-time, draws a small paycheck, and
encourages her spouse to think of her contribution as marginal or as
"pin money."

Rubin and

I

This seems to be the way that most of the women with whom

spoke presented their jobs to their husbands, though most

also admitted that their financial contributions were probably much

more for necessities than luxuries.
The validity of the husband's sacrifice and his self-esteem are

severely threatened, however, when the wife insists that her husband
is as dependent upon her work for his security as he would like her to

be upon his

Bennett and Cobb argue that the ideology of sacrifice is also

jeopardized by successful children who move out of the community to
new career opportunities.

Fathers find their hard work "rewarded" in
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an unexpected way as the family life which gave their
sacrifices meaning
is broken up in the ultimate fulfillment of those sacrifices.

Thus, the

unit for which they sacrificed is also undermined by those sacrifices.
In my own experience,

I

have not found any instances of this.

sus-

I

pect not that it never occurs, but rather that the opportunities for
escaping a working class life are not so available as Sennett and Cobb
seem to suggest.

In my experience, and certainly in Rubin's, most of the

children of working class parents expect to and have departed very little
from their parents' way of life.
Their argument does suggest, though, the intimate connection which
exists between the ideology of sacrifice and the importance of extended
family ties to working class people.

For the working class man espe-

cially, his family is his most important resource.

It provides companion-

ship, an outlet for tension and, perhaps, for some of his natural talents.

The family, most of all, is a place of solace.

The belief that one is sacrificing for the family legitimizes the
time spent at work in boring, often demanding jobs.

His work helps to

keep the family unit intact, to give its members and himself the self-

respect of staying off the welfare rolls.
Since most other avenues for independence and achievement are closed
off to most working class men, the family is enhanced as that institution

through which the young family member can hope to achieve a sense of

purpose and respect.
evident
For, as Lillian Rubin demonstrates, even when there is
fostered.
talent in a working class youngster, it is generally not

fulfillment often becomes the possessor's daydream.

Its

And the future is
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not a career and lifestyle commensurate with one's natural
abilities, but
one which mirrors their parents' adulthood.

They'll most likely marry,

work in jobs similar to their parents, live in the same community,
and
rear their children with similar values.
As one of Rubin's respondents said in response to her question:

"When you were little, what did you think you'd like to do when you

grew up?"
dreamed I wanted to be a policeman, but
followed through with it.
I

(Rubin:

I

just never

Why was that?)

I really didn't think I was smart enough, I guess I knew
you had to go through three, maybe four years of college.
And I don't know, I just kind of let it go. Even if I
had thought I was smart enough, there was no way I ever
thought about going to college.
I guess the really big
dream was just to get out of high school and get a job.
Things were tough at home.
I wanted more than anything
else to get some money in my pocket so that I could do
something, have some fun once in a while. Now, I can't
figure out why I thought working was such a big deal.
But how can you know things like that when you're a kid?^-^

Working class girls seem to have a similar lack of clarity about
careers.

One of the wives Rubin spoke with said:

goals about being anything, except

"I never had any

always figured I'd get married

I

and have kids, and that would be enough for anybody."^'*

And one of the women with whom

I

spoke:

In high school, you had to go to the guidance counselor
every year and tell him what you wanted to do when you
Once I told him I wanted to go to college,
got out.
once to beauty school, and once, I think, to art school.
The whole thing made me really nervous because you had
But
to have everything planned out before you went in.
I
do,'
to
thing
good
all he ever did was say 'that's a
figured
I
Anyhow,
mean, I didn't get a lot of help.
I'd get married and not have to worry.
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And for most working class youngsters, marriage and child-rearing,

which most often mean the same thing, are the ways to establish independence from parents and grandparents.
young women marry and have children.

Young men get jobs and marry;

That is how most working class men

and women enter adulthood.

Family roles,

family models, and family traditions provide members

with a purpose for their labor and a rather solid self-identity.

They

are roles and ways of living which are not without their joys as well as

pains; and they are ways which are not always embraced with great enthusiasm.

But the extended family experience is accepted by most members

and is the most important source of self-respect they have.
As with their spouses, working class wives are family-oriented

For most, the family roles of wife and mother are the only

people.

adult roles open to them.

The women

I

spoke with, for instance, were

not encouraged by parents and school authorities to embark on careers

Said one:

even when they showed talent.

I didn't do well; I still can't
never liked school.
spell.
I am embarrassed by this, especially when I
I found
I never write letters.
have to fill out forms.
I had some talent in art, but my guidance counselor told
me art is a hobby, not a job.
I

This woman eloped early in her senior year in high school.

Another woman told me:

"At nineteen, when

marriage was the greatest way out."

got married,

I

thought

And married life has been fulfilling,

at least in some ways, for these women.

only life worth living as an adult.

I

For them, married life is the

They cannot imagine going through

that an establife alone, without spouses, children, all the relatives

lished marriage brings with it.
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A spouse is the person to whom a woman can always turn when
things

go wrong at work, or with the children, or with other family
members.

Married life symbolizes adulthood and also the stability and community
most of them say they want.

Children are viewed as the natural outcome of marriage, indeed,
and especially for women, one of the central reasons for marriage.

Children are important even though they often create pressures in the
marriage.

They are a drain on the family budget; and the same tight

budget allows their parents few opportunities to take some time away
from them.

But even though family roles are primary ones for most working
class women, all of those with whom
it over again,

I

spoke said that, had they to do

they would wait a few years longer before getting married

They said either that they would work a little longer, or try to launch
a career, or perhaps,

go to college.

But (and this came, invariably, in some form from every woman)
I would get married, I could
I am not a woman's libber.
I need my family, my husband,
never go through life alone.
For me, marriage
support,
I guess.
them
for
kids.
need
I
my
married, but it's
got
first
was
when
I
is not what I thought it
the best relationship for me.
"Besides," most would continue, "who are they kidding?
time and I'm exhausted.

You can't tell me

I

I

work part

could have a career, plus

raise the kids, plus be the dream wife and housekeeper you see in these

magazines

.

Women's Liberation is conceived of as a movement which either puts

unrealistic demands upon women or forces them to break family bonds.
If women are to have careers

(magazine stories to the contrary) someone

or
else must assume the major responsibility of rearing the children,
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else childrearing must be postponed or rejected altogether.

What is more, a liberated woman, at least through these women's
eyes, must be totally independent, most especially from her husband.
It is a picture of womanhood most working class women have difficulty

even imagining.

There seems to be no place, at least in the popular

conceptions of women's liberation movement, for the type of relationships
most characteristic of working class family life; relationships of
dependence, sometimes subordination, of long-term and extended commitments.

It is not surprising that, as one woman said,

"I just can't see

myself in a life like that."
The image of the liberated woman is a threatening family image,
as well as a foreign one, because as popularly expressed, it is a dis-

paragement of those without career ambitions, of those women who are
content to be housewives, and of those who sometimes bolster their

husband's self-esteem at the expense of their own.

Feminists who fail

to understand the importance of the family to working class women, most

especially how it is the institution which gives them their greatest
sense of self, risk alienating most of this large group.
This near-blanket rejection of the women's liberation movement does
not necessarily mean that working class women find no fault with their

current way of life.

Lillian Rubin found many instances of depression

and anxiety in women she interviewed.

Many women were discouraged at

the lack of communication in their marriage; at the ambiguous sexual

roles their husbands wished them to play; at the dull routine of keeping

house and rearing the children; at the lack of help from their spouses.
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But these arrangements are familiar and acceptable nevertheless,

particularly when compared with the feminist alternative.
In sum, there are many pressures which encourage working class men

and women to marry and form a particular way of life.

The way of life,

nevertheless, is generally acceptable to most, and provides its members

with a sense of self and of self-respect.

The roles, commitments,

expectations which are characteristic of working class family life

provide most of its members with their strongest identity.
This is not to say, again,- that all members who identify with
the roles, etc., actually fulfill the expectations inherent in them.

For many reasons, including the possibility that other sources of self-

identification are not readily available to most members of this class,
some working class people do not actually live up to the obligations and

commitments characteristic of the working class ideal.
Most of the people from whom this background was drawn seemed to

be members of "settled" working class families, though there are hints

which suggest otherwise.

Again,

I

suspect that this is largely

attributable to the fact that the family way of life in these instances
was supported by lack of mobility and ethnic and religious traditions

compatible with and supportive of this way of life.
The setting out of the main features of this way of life, even if
not all members fully or even largely adhere to its principles, helps
the selfus to see how greatly it shapes the ideas and beliefs, indeed

of its participants.

understanding

The understanding should help us

most members of
see why abortion on demand is such a great threat to
this class.

I

shall turn, now, to an elaboration of this.

5
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When Lillian Rubin was discussing a working class woman's early

marriage (precipitated by pregnancy) with her, she asked the woman if
she had ever considered having an abortion.

The woman responded.

Never, I could never do that.
God, I remember how
terrified I was.
I kept thinking it couldn't be true,
I remember even thinking that I would take my mom's
car and drive it off a cliff.
I knew he'd marry me.
I never doubted that.
But I didn't want to get married
I wanted to do things and to have things. 2

Says Rubin,

.

"Not one person, woman or man, even considered abortion -

generally not because of religious scruples, but because the idea, they
said, was

'disgusting,'
.

occurred to them.'"

'not a choice'; or because it 'just never

26

Rubin theorizes that these beliefs about abortion are encouraged
First, she believes that beliefs about abortion

by two circumstances.

were more restrictive prior to 1973, because abortion was illegal in
most circumstances then.

All of the women with whom she spoke had their

"problem" pregnancies prior to 1973; the other children born to the

remaining men and women were born well before then also.
Rubin argues that their current beliefs are most likely attributed
to the fact that abortions were illegal during their reproductive years.

She expects these men and women to change their beliefs as abortion on

demand becomes more acceptable; and younger working class men and women
accept it more readily.
Rubin argues that the other reason the people she interviewed were
of wedso opposed to abortion even though the pregnancy occurred out

however unconlock, was because the pregnancies were allowed to occur,
in their
sciously, so the couple could marry and assume adult status

respective families.

For,

as one of the men Rubin interviewed said.
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"If a girl got pregnant, you married her.

There wasn't no choice.

"^"^

In my own conversations with working class women,
some of whom

were pregnant when they married (and most of whom could have
obtained
a legal abortion)

,

I

did not find the more enthusiastic embrace of

liberalized abortion laws which Rubin anticipated.

I

suspect that, in

this instance at least, Rubin does not make the connection between

abortion and the obligations and commitments which sustain working
class family life.
In my conversations,

I

did find an unwillingness to acknowledge

that all abortions were always wrong, and that women who have abortions

were always making an immoral decision.

Typical of conversations

I

had

are these:

could never have an abortion. No, it's not for me. Why?
think it's a person. Having had a baby, I don't see how
you make a decision that now it's a person and now it's not.
It's a person from the very beginning - at least to me it
is.
When I was carrying Brandy, that's the way I thought
of it.
I

I

Now, that's just for me, and that's just in normal circumstances.
If I had gotten measles or something, and the
doctor said for sure I'd have a retarded child, I'd have to
think for a long time, about having it. Probably we would,
but, well, that's awfully hard.

My friend, Mandy got pregnant just about four months ago,
She said it was because she
and she had an abortion.
couldn't afford to redecorate her apartment and have another
baby.
I don't know if that's really why, but if it is, I
I could never do that.
think that's wrong.
,

Would you ever join the Right-to-Life movement or

a

similar anti-abortion

group?
I'm not what you'd call political.
don't think so.
I usually don't
I don't belong to any political groups.
I just vote the way my
even know when elections are.
husband tells me to.
I
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Abortion is personal, I think.
In my family, you just
don't have one.
It's a baby from the very beginning, and
everyone loves it way before it is born. No one would
forgive you, I think, if you aborted it. You try to plan
it so you can at least half-way afford a new baby; but if
it happens by mistake, you'll manage somehow.
And another:
When I found I was pregnant with Janice, I told David and
he was thrilled. We got married right away. We never
thought about abortion. We both think it's a person and
that it would be wrong to kill it like that.
In some ways, I have more confidence in myself because I
had the baby. My parents practically disowned me; I was
bored at home; and marriage wasn't what it was cracked up
to be.
But I made it.

When Janice was born, I didn't love her. It's still hard
for me to admit, but I didn't.
I had to give up so much
One of my friends was
for her, I resented her a lot.
pregnant when she got married and she felt the same way
about her baby. We were so relieved to find out, we
both started to cry.
I mean, it's not that we hated the
babies or anything. But carrying them was lonely and
humiliating.
Did you ever consider abortion?

Maybe because it was illegal, but I doubt it. We
could have found someone to do it. We just felt that
I mean
we had to take responsibility for what we did.
It
how could we kill a baby because we got caught.
wasn't her fault after all. No. We never really conIf I did have an abortion, I
sidered not having her.
wouldn't have told anyone. Even now, I'd keep it a
I d be too ashamed to let my family know.
secret.
No.

'

In the conversations

procedure of desperation
for themselves.

,

I

had, abortion was always discussed as a

and one which none of the women would consider

Every woman

I

spoke with gave the primary reason for

her opposition to abortion on demand that to her and her spouse and
without
family, the fetus was a person, and it's wrong to kill persons

good reason.

that
Most could not come up with any good reasons except

there was "proof positive'
if the health of the mother were endangered or
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that the fetus would be born retarded.

Every woman went on to elaborate, once she stated her belief in
the early personhood of the fetus, about how close she had felt to the

developing fetus during each of her pregnancies.

Most spoke of having

prepared names for the babies well before they were born, and of the
various emotional reactions of each of the relatives.

Clearly, each

baby was "part of the family" well before it was delivered.
None of the women considered abortion a matter they would decide

When

upon alone.

I

asked each of them if they would include their

spouses in a decision to abort or not, most them reacted with
"

Of course

I

would.

Why wouldn't I?

to support it and everything, right?

I

mean, he's half of it.

a shocked,

He has

It's just as much his as it is mine,

right?"

A few of the women said they knew of women who had abortions, but
These suspected that if any of their

most did not know anyone who had.

relatives or close friends had had an abortion, they would have kept the
fact very confidential.

For abortion was definitely an unacceptable

method for dealing with a pregnancy, however, unwanted.
None of the women with whom

I

spoke was in any way involved in the

public debate about abortion, though all of them were strongly opposed to
family members taking advantage of liberal abortion laws.

Some of the

women were concerned that liberal laws were encouraging women to end
pregnancies they might otherwise have come to accept and carry to term.
tempted by
Most expressed concern that their own daughters would be

could condone such
such laws to abort unplanned pregnancies, though none
action.

fertility
They planned to help their daughters deal with their
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by giving them contraceptive information when they thought they
needed
it.

All of the women insisted upon the distinction between contracep-

tion and abortion.

They would tell their sons and daughters that while

"in this day and age" they should know about methods of birth control,

they should never think the family would condone an abortion by any of
its members.

For the women

interviewed, liberal abortion laws, though generally

I

tolerated, also seemed to threaten them.
The direct threat was, of course, that their daughters would be

tempted into an abortion they could have performed with such ease.

Such

an act would be a challenge both to the parents and the values of sacri-

fice and respect they sought to encourage in their children.

The

indirect threat of liberal abortion laws was, as some implied, that
their very existence challenged the commitments which sustain working
class family life.

In general, though, most of the discussion about

abortion was a discussion of why it would have been impossible for the

women themselves and their spouses to have considered having one.
For the women with whom

I

spoke, childbearing and childrearing were

the most fulfilling activities in their lives.

pregnancies with great delight.
carrying my children.

"I

Most looked back to their

felt very special when

I

was

Everyone was always helping me and was very

excited planning for the new baby.

And

I

enjoyed having the babies inside

me, guessing what they'd be like when they got older."

Even the woman who was depressed about her first, "accidental"
pregnancy, spoke glowingly of her second.
Their pregnancies did not disturb careers, but began them.

They
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situated the married couple more firmly in the extended family with

childrearing and bearing experiences to share, with clothes and furniture to be loaned to or borrowed from other family members.

Now

I

suspect that most of the women with whom

have an abortion themselves.

I

spoke would not

The systems of family supports, of ethnic

traditions and religious commitments seem strong enough in most
instances that the women would carry an unexpected pregnancy to term.

But there are hints, even from these women, that perhaps they would not
live up to the ideal (of respect for life)

they publicly support.

Consider, for example, the woman who said that even if she had an
abortion, she would not tell anyone

whom

I

;

or the statements of every woman with

spoke that if someone they knew did have an abortion, most likely

no one else would ever find out about it.

Consider, too, the words of one of the women Linda Bird Franke inter-

viewed in the waiting room of an abortion clinic.

The woman was

waiting for her daughter to have an abortion:
was brought up to believe that intercourse was a sin
before you are married, and I believed it and I still do.
I think you
So, according to the Bible she has sinned.
That's the way I feel about
are supposed to be married.
And I told her that, but I guess she didn't pay no
it.
mind. We are church-going people and I take her there
every Sunday. But I didn't talk to the preacher about it
Only her sisters and her brother and my mother know about
^8
I told her it's murder to have an abortion.
it
I

.

Clearly, the commitment to respect the fetus is shared by all of

these women.

It is an essential ingredient of their identity that they

reliable,
consider themselves and are considered by others to be gentle,

self-sacrificing women.
that working class
It would be too simple, moreover, to conclude

.
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women who publicly oppose abortion but have them anyway, or working
class men who publicly embrace family life but abuse their children,
are irrational or deceitful.

Surely, this is sometimes the cause.
the inconsistencies,

I

But, a deeper explanation of

suggest, would first recognize the intimate

connection which exists between the roles and expectations of the

working class ideal of family life and their self-identifications.

Then

the explanation would recognize that the stability of this way of life
is to an important extent contingent upon circumstances

(lack of

mobility, strong ethnic ties) which are increasingly difficult to
maintain; and, finally, that other sources of self-identification are
rare
We can expect that most working class people who largely live up
to the obligations and commitments inherent in their way of life to

oppose liberal abortion laws because they threaten the family experience and values which shape their self-identity.

We can also expect

that members who share this self-identification, but who privately do
not always live up to the ideal, will oppose such laws, perhaps even

more vigorously than the others.
There are, then, at least two levels to working class anti-

abortionism.

They are linked by a common source of identity:

family way of life
I

I

have set out.

the

The loss of this identity would,

suspect, be just as acute for those on both levels.
class life
It seems likely that there is another level to working

which includes members who are not opposed to abortion.

Judith Blake's

class people
evidence suggests, for example, that while most working
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are opposed to abortion, not all are.
I

suspect that these members are much less likely to identify

with the form of family life most characteristic of working class life.
The neighborhood ties, stability, extended and close kinship ties,

strong ethnic and religious traditions have eroded in some areas of the
country,

I

suspect, and the obligations and commitments, including

those which encourage opposition to liberal abortion laws, have less
support.

We can expect in such circumstances that these members will

be much less likely to identify themselves primarily with the tradi-

tional way of family life and to defend that way of life against

outside threats.
There are then, probably at least three levels within the working
class itself with respect to the issue of abortion.

And we can expect

that the more closely members identify with the ideal of family life,

whether or not they always, privately live up to the ideal, the more
vociferous will be their opposition to liberal abortion laws.
Now, most feminists do not make this connection between self-

identification and the ideal of family life.

This encourages them to

misinterpret opposition to liberal abortion laws.
The reasons most feminists give for supporting liberal abortion
laws, for example, do not seem to pertain to working class women.

Long-established or labored for careers will not be disturbed by an
unexpected pregnancy.

On the contrary, it is through childbearing that

most working class women "come into their own" as women.
very
Also, most of these women consider the fetus a person from

early on, generally well before the third month of pregnancy.

The

relationship between the working class mother and her fetus

- a

relation-

ship of mutual dependence, of nurturance - may be thought of as a

paradigm of working class family relationships.

Most feminists do not

speak of a relationship between the mother and fetus, preferring to

consider both separate entities.

What would be thought of as a minor

surgical procedure (the abortion) by most feminists, would be a loss and
a

murder to most working class women.
Finally, building upon this, the fetus is not thought of by the

working class woman as an individual with rights against her and
other individuals with whom it happens to be involved.
is based,

Family life

rather, upon a system of loyalties, obligations, trust,

commitments, which preclude treating members solely as individuals with
rights against one another.

Husbands and wives, their children, parents, and relatives are

bound together in a unit which is rooted in mutual dependence and
respect for all members.

The respect extends to the dead in the family

as well as to those not yet born into it.

It is common to hear that

"your grandfather would want you to do this if he were alive today," or
"I visit aunt so-and-so because my mother always did;

hurt if everyone forgot her old aunt."

and she would be

The present is shaped both by

the past and the future.

Most of the women with whom

I

spoke mentioned that they are con-

cerned that such respect for others and for our natural resources is
diminishing.

One woman, the most strongly opposed to liberal abortion

the effect
laws, said that she felt tremendously "uncomfortable" about

such laws were "really having" on American women.

"It probably seems
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all right now, with all this women's lib and all; but

I

that all of this wasting of life will catch up with us.
it.

keep thinking
I

worry about

"

Said another woman:

"I'm trying to get my kids to see how valuable

everything is, to learn to make do.

They're pretty spoiled in a lot of

ways; but if they have to, if we have a depression,

able to survive.

I

I

know they'll be

don't want them to get the idea that it's okay to

be wasteful."

Every woman with whom

I

took great pride and delight.

spoke had a vegetable garden in which she

Said one:

garden; it makes me feel good to think
for supper.

I

"I

love to take care of this

helped make what we're having

Besides, it helps out."

This respect for natural resources and concern about waste is

compatible with the other concerns of working class family life.

Indeed,

it would be surprising to learn that members did not have such a con-

cern for the immediate environment.
In the same way, the opposition to most instances of abortion is

"compatible" with, indeed, required by, the way of life most working
class people share.

The opposition, at least for one's own members,

accords with the values of respect and sacrifices for all members
(including those not yet born) at the root of the family life.

The

opposition flows from a form of life shaped by a particular view of
the past and future; of appropriate roles for all members; of standards

of excellence, of respect, of worthiness.
The beliefs that members have about one another and about themselves

help to constitute that way of life and their self-understandings.

.
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These connections between self-interpretations, identity, and the beliefs
which help to shape a way of life, emphasize the danger of trying to
settle a controversy like abortion in abstraction from particular ways

of life.
The purpose of this chapter was to suggest that working class anti-

abortionism can be understood most fruitfully by understanding the way
of life from which the beliefs flow.
ideal.

It is above all a family-centered

Other institutions, such as work and politics (and with the

possible exception of the Church) do not vie with the family for the
personal and extensive commitments of its members.
The family, ideally, is the place where members find solace from
the pressures and boredom of work:

a place where,

through marriage

and starting a family of one's own, the status of adulthood is conferred; where members can find identity and purpose.

My interpretation of this way of life is an attempt to show that

working class anti-abortionism "makes sense," is "rational" when understood from within the way of life itself.

The standards which encourage

and enable such a form of life necessitates opposition to most forms of

abortion
We do not have to argue, that all members of working class families
do live up to the ideal.

that this is not so.

Recent child abuse and divorce statistics reveal

It is, perhaps, more revealing to show that most

working class people identify with the way of life, that the identifithe oblication is primary, and that even though not all privately meet
to oppose
gations of the way of life, they can be expected nevertheless

laws which threaten it.
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Now,

if,

as

I

assume, anti-abortionism is intrinsic to this way of

life, and if the way of life is prized or at least accepted by most of
its members, there is a compelling reason to include these people as

participants in the debate about liberal abortion laws.
Such laws threaten the values of respect for the fetus, of

sacrifice for the family, of responsibility for all life one has
created.

Understanding the anti-abortionism in this light opens up

several issues, not now discussed in the controversy which

explore in the next chapter.

I

shall

.

.
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CHAPTER III
POPULARIZED PRO-ABORTIONISM

1

.

-

A MINIMAL CRITIQUE

The Abortion Decisions

In its 1973 decision, Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court rejected

Texas' claim that life begins at conception and that the state has the
right, therefore, to protect such life by prohibiting abortion except
to save the life of the mother.

It rejected that claim, first, on

the grounds that

We need not resolve the difficult question of when life
begins. When those trained in the respectable discipline
of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive
at any consensus, the judiciary at this point in the
development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to
speculate as to the answer.

And second,
In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been
reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before birth or to accord legal right to
the unborn except in narrowly defined situations and
except when the rights are contingent upon live birth.

The Court concluded that the state does have a compelling interest in

protecting potential human life, but only at viability, "because then
the fetus has the capacity of meaningful life outside the mother's

womb

.

3

And in Doe v. Bolton, the other 1973 abortion decision, the Court
found unconstitutional some of Georgia's abortion regulations because
they were not reasonably related to health of the mother.

These decisions, legalizing abortion on demand, were both the

best and the worst possible decisions.
52

They were the best for the
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pro-abortionists because they were viewed as a humane, pi±ilic and legal
response to the problems of women's oppression, family instability,

poverty and over-population.

They were the worst for the country as

a whole because they signalled to the pro-abortionists the end of the

need to debate further the implications of liberal abortion laws.

This

withdrawal from public discourse has encouraged a deterioration of public debate and a weakening of the liberal position itself.

The possibilities for compromise, moreover, are dependent in part

upon a resumption of debate, with particular emphasis on the status of
the fetus, the use of abortion as a contraceptive of first resort, and

the real intentions of those participants in the abortion controversy.

The 1973 decisions have resulted in great public access (particularly

through the media) to arguments for abortion and very little to anti-

What is more, the pro-abortionist positions

abortionist positions.

have been the subject of very little critique.
In this chapter,

I

shall explore the popularized version of pro-

abortionism, particularly the characterization of most anti-abortionists
as mean-spirited, religious males.

I

shall argue that this characteri-

zation is not only inaccurate, but also has the effect of pushing to
the Right many working class anti-abortionists who would rather not

make that move, and of diminishing the possibilities for compromise.
I

shall elucidate the pro-abortionist position and offer a minimal

critique of it.

In the following chapter,

I

use the work of two

prominent pro-abortionists to suggest that the popularized version of

pro-abortionism is not only counter-productive, but also helps to
undermine the very liberalism it explicitly celebrates.

^

:
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2.

Popularized Pro-abortioni sm

There are several key features of the popularized version which
shall examine in turn.

I

The first is the argument that abortion on demand

is the keystone to women's freedom.

According to most feminist writers, reproductive freedom is the
key to achieving other freedoms.

And the right to abortion on demand,

as the guarantor of reproductive freedom, is the keystone to achieving

equality, freedom, fulfillment for all women.

Gloria Steinem says, for instance, that:
If we can't have power over our bodies from the skin in,
how can we have power over our bodies from the skin out?...
the demand for reproductive freedom, as an inalienable
human right, has become the bottom line for women throughout the world. And abortion, as the contraceptive means
of last resort becomes the crucial battleground.

Never again can political leaders be allowed to call
themselves friends of women, no matter what their positions are on other issues, unless they also support
reproductive freedom on a basic human right. Our freedom
and equality depend on it.*^
And Lawrence Lader:
For Women's Liberation, abortion became the great cataWhether they aimed at moderate goals like job
lyst.
equality, or the complete dissolution of the nuclear
family, the feminists quickly learned that all of their
progress depended on a woman's control of her own body
The ultimate freedom remains the right
and fertility.
of every woman to legalized abortion.

And Betty Freidan
...we have come to recognize that there is no freedom,
no equality, no full human dignity and personhood
possible for women until we have control over our own

bodies

.

importance
There are three reasons generally acknowledged for the

of reproductive freedom to women's freedom in general.
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First, there is the claim that a woman cannot be free if she does

not have full control over her physical activity.
to be basic, essential - a natural right of women.

This control is assumed

According to this

claim, the state has no legitimate right to regulate what a woman can

and cannot do with her own body.

This claim is usually not argued, though

it underpins most feminist arguments for elective abortion laws

.

And

the right of women to control their own bodies is generally interpreted

narrowly as the right to control their reproductive capacities.
The assumption that there can be no freedom for women until there
is reproductive freedom is dependent upon the second claim.

This is

that reproduction narrows a woman's possibilities for developing fully
all her talents.

Reproduction can be burdensome, it is argued, because

women are also the child- rearers

,

and childrearing itself is for the

most part "narrow" and "degrading."

Continuous and/or exclusive

childrearing, it is claimed, discourages women from developing other
.

.

capacities.

7

The implicit assumption here is that every woman has talents to

develop which are not exhausted by producing and raising her offspring;
and that each woman is unfulfilled, unfree, to the extent that she is

unable to explore these capacities.
A second aspect of the popularized version of pro-abortionism is
the claim that women's reproductive systems have been and sometimes con-

tinue to be controlled by men to further their male interests and to

inhibit women's development.

There are several theories about why this

has occurred.
denied
Wendall Waters suggests, for instance, that abortion is

^
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most women as a method of family planning because of "demographic
aggression" of male political, religious, and economic leaders.

This

occurs even though the denial promotes serious physical, economic, and

psychological problems for the women who bear unwanted children, and
for the children themselves.

Says Waters,

"The feminists are perfectly

correct when they declare that if men had to bear babies, compulsory

pregnancy laws would have disappeared long ago." g
Waters suggests that the desires of male leaders for domination in
their spheres have overwhelmed their senses of compassion for the burdens

most women face when they bear children.

He argues that these men have

used their positions or power to force women to reproduce and that, until
recently, women have been unable to respond.

Gloria Steinem and Garrett Hardin's claims are compatible with those
of Water's.

Steinem argues that since women's bodies are "society's most

basic means of production," women's freedom to choose abortion is the
freedom "most likely to be resisted by the patriarchal structures,

regardless of their interest in population control or even in saving
money."

.

She continues:

We produce the workers and the soldiers of the patriarchy
and controlling our reproductive processes is the sole way
that the growth and identity of a race or religion or nation
can be assured (which is why the most racist societies
opposed
Hitler's Germany, for instance - have been the most
to abortion or other decision-making by women.

And Garrett Hardin claims that the most important reason for

opposition is that laws opposing abortion were made by men.

Men, never

having experienced the suffering of motherhood, not to mention the
suffering of unwanted motherhood, are willing to allow women to

experience this adversity.

Hardin claims, in Mandatory Motherhood, that
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if men were the ones to bear children, there would be no abortion

laws."'"^

Other feminists suggest that opposition to abortion is part of a
fear in men that women would threaten their power positions as they

develop the talents which were untapped while they reared their offspring.
Evelyn Reed, for example, has argued that the opposition by the
Catholic Hierarchy is motivated by

a

desire to control women lest they

challenge the power of its members:
By opposing and seeking to overthrow the Supreme Court
decision (Roe v. Wade) the Catholic hierarchy is striving
to keep all women in the same status as animal females who
are subjected by nature to uncontrolled procreation.
They
are determined to continue to rob women of their basic
human right - the right to control.''""'"
This, according to Reed, is because the hierarchy is concerned that

if

women gain control over their bodies they will forthwith
proceed to fight for full control over their minds and
,

lives. ^2

A third aspect of the pro-abortionist argument is that working class

people, particularly working class women, are opposed to abortion because
they mistakenly assume that the consequences of a decline of traditional

families (presumably hastened by elective abortion) would be disastrous
for them.

For the traditional family, in this version, is a miniature

male
of the patriarchal system and is perpetuated by the manipulations of

political, religious, and economic leaders to the detriment of working
class people.
of the New
Alan Hunter and Linda Gordon argue that the leaders

without the
Right play on the fears of working class people that

world will be
traditional family compassion and solace from the work
nowhere to be found.

the
The New Right leaders intentionally obscure

.
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way the family oppresses women and encourages men to think of their
futures as unchangeable."'"^

Andrea Dworkin also argues that women on the Right like Ruth Carter

Stapleton and Anita Bryant (now repentant) manipulate family symbols
and encourage women to continue to play their traditional roles (par-

ticularly procreative roles) even though this type family victimizes

women

14

The popularized version of pro-abortionism also suggests that most,
if not all, anti-abortionists are not ignorant of the consequences anti-

abortionism has for some men and all women; they are, rather, vicious,
insensitive and unreasonable.

The gist of the argument is that since

elective abortion is so overwhelmingly popular, those who oppose it must
also oppose the spirit of democratic rule and the humane objectives of

elective abortion.

Karen Mulhauser, Executive Director of the National Abortion Rights

Action League (NARAL), says,
With fanatical zeal, and backed by hundreds of thousands
of dollars, the so-called 'right to life' forces have made
maior advances in their current attack of those women least
the poor.-^-'
able to defend themselves:
A recent NARAL newsletter suggested that those who oppose abortion
on demand are "repressive," "antichoice

,

"

and "inhiJinane" in allowing

unwanted children to be born.
To these claims is often added the charge of insincerity:

that

is
those who oppose abortion on demand on the grounds that the fetus

capital punishment and
a person with the right to live also support

did support the war in Viet Nam.

16
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Garrett Hardin suggests that those who insist that unwanted or

possibly defective infants to be born do so "because it is easy to bear
the adversity of another."

Gloria Steinem likens societies without

liberal abortion laws to Hitler's Germany. 1
Samuel Bair, in his book Abortion:

A Woman's Choice

,

says that

there are three groups of people who oppose liberal abortion laws.

first group includes those who are opposed on religious grounds.

The

This

group, he insists, is a very tiny minority whose views, moreover, should
not be considered in a democracy (where Church and State properly
separate)

.

The second group includes those who "cannot identify with

a woman in distress."

Finally, there are those who "visualize elevating

their personal moral stature before others and themselves."

18

Bair concludes that the totality of all three groups is a small

minority, though members are well-financed and vociferous.

Bair also states that
The real problems of an unwanted pregnancy for someone
who can barely support an existing family have never
interested the opponents of abortion .. .Beneath the clamoring
righteousness, there is a silent iceberg of suffering, and
the anti-abortionists prove their lack of respect for the
tragedies they cause. -'-^

Laura Shapiro, a feminist writer, in Mother Jones

,

shares Bair's

assumptions about the inhumanity of most anti-abortionists.

She

characterizes the abortion opposition as coming from "fanatics" and
^
those who have brought abortionists to trial "manic and vengeful.
T

„20

laws,
In the growing body of literature promoting liberal abortion
laws.
there is little, if any, sympathy extended those who oppose the

the fetus
With the exception of passing mention of those who consider

subject charge that antia person, most pro-abortionists writing on the

1

.
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abortionists are motivated by a contempt for those who suffer because
their pregnancies are unwanted.
Finally, the popularized version of pro-abortionism insists that the

fetus's right to life is far surpassed by the harm that inevitably would
come to it, its mother, and the rest of society by virtue of its being

unwanted
Some of the assumptions which support this goal are first, that it
is the poor who are most disadvantaged by unwanted pregnancies.

Already

financially strapped, additional offspring only exacerbate an already

difficult way of life.

For these people, abortion would be the great

equalizer:

Prior to the liberalization of New York's abortion law, the
total fertility rate of blacks was 2.85, as compared to 2.15
for whites... In the course of just 18 months, the ... rate of
blacks fell to 2.11, the replacement level, while white fertility declined much more modestly to 1.84... The evidence is
compelling that... by enabling blacks to avert what must have
been a considerable number of unwanted births, and thereby
reproduce at a rate more compatible with the well-being of
the family unit, abortion legalization may rank as one of the
2
greatest social equalizers of our time.
•

Second, it is assiamed that elective abortion would spare unwanted

offspring the less than fulfilling life which seems to be their lot.

The

evidence, universally cited here, is a Swedish study which compared two

hundred and twenty boys and girls born in 1961-1963 to women who were
denied legal abortions twice during the same pregnancy, with an equal
number of children whose mothers did not request abortions.

The

researchers concluded that those children whose mothers had been declined
abortions suffered

"higher

incidence of illness and hospitalization...

slightly poorer school marks and performance (and)

integration in the peer group.

.,22

a

somewhat worse
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Third, abortion is assumed to spare the mother psychological and

emotional trauma.
In sum,

the popularized version of pro-abortionism is:

that an

overwhelming majority of Americans support a woman's right to choose
abortion; that the bearing and rearing of children drains women of their

natural talents; that conservative anti-abortion laws originated in

attempts by men to suppress women, and their liberalization signals an
end to oppression; that some in the higher echelons of religious,
economic, and political power continue to manipulate working class people
into supporting the destructive conservative laws despite the harm it

does them; that aside from the manipulated, those who continue to sup-

port conservative laws are inhumane, power-hungry, well-heeled fanatics;
and finally, that the physical and emotional harm incurred by the mother,

child and rest of society by an unwanted pregnancy carried to term far

surpasses the right of the fetus to be born alive.

3.

A Minimal Critique of Pro-Abortionism

There is a minimal critique of this position which
and which

I

I

shall offer now

shall build upon in the next chapter.

The assumption that a substantial majority of Americans supports

abortion on demand appears, as
dubious.

I

have already suggested, more and more

While there is unquestionably wide support for some forms of

and limitations
abortion, the beliefs of most Americans are full of nuance

not taken into account by most pro-abortionists.

But given the importance

serious attention
of this claim to their case, we should expect some

given to its documentation.

We have special reason to expect documenta-

"

"
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tion given to their claims that the new support for abortion
on demand is
due, in large part, to a recent major change in men's beliefs
about women.

But there is, by and large, little attention paid to the massive changes
in ideas and beliefs which must have occurred very recently for there
to be widespread support for elective abortion laws.

One of the only writers who tries to account for it is Lawrence Lader,

who says that prior to 1968, "the most puzzling issue in the revolt

against abortion laws (was) why women suffered quietly for so long.
A leaden apathy suffocated all protest, even though birth control had

reached respectability by 1935 and other nations had completely legalized
abortion

.

Lader

23

's

account of the abortion movements during the late 1960

's

is

focused, for the most part, on those women who "came out" for abortion

when they joined the Women's Liberation Movement.

He argues that these

women, especially feminist leaders like Germaine Greer, realized that the

key to all liberation was a woman's right to control her own body and that
this must include the right to elective abortion.

Lader argues that these

women educated other women to these facts and "mobilized them from their
apathy

.

But Lader 's account is limited by its focus on these feminist leaders,
He does not explain how these women generated support from men and women

not involved in or even opposed to the feminist cause.

Lader is surely

aware of these people, and that they are substantial numbers, as he

documents many instances where feminist pro-abortion activities were dis-

rupted by large numbers of male and female opponents.
Garrett Hardin suggests that male leaders finally realized that
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without elective abortion, the earth's "carrying" or survival capacity

would be threatened seriously. 24
For the most part, though, the question of change is not explored.

Most writers merely assume that beliefs changed, and changed radically,
that male leaders from all spheres, and members of the general public,

changed their minds about elective abortion.

And that the reproductive

freedom implied by elective abortion will encourage a reformulation of
the goals of our patriarchal system, promoting full self-realization for

women
These accounts surely lose some of their explanatory power by not

having explored the enormous changes which must have occurred.

We are

left with the conclusion that, for some reason or reasons, men who

previously wanted only to exploit women, now do not.

And women who

could be manipulated into thinking that such exploitation was in their

best interests, came to a "true consciousness"

-

all sometime during the

years 1968-1972, when public opinion allegedly shifted overwhelmingly to

support abortion on demand.
The across-the-board inattention given to reasons for supposed

changes most people underwent about liberal abortion laws is important
not only because of the lack of plausibility it gives most pro-abortionist

accounts, but also because those accounts are used commonly to legitimate

assumptions and beliefs about the alleged minority which still opposed
elective abortion.
of the women
A second reason for criticism is the fact that most

having abortions are using no form of contraception.

which

I

Every estimate of

abortions, at least 90%,
am aware suggests that most women having
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were using no method of contraception whatsoever at the time of conception.

These women were not, for the most part, contraceptively ignorant.

Abortion

was their chosen method of contraception. 25

Implicit in the pro-abortionist argument is the assumption that men
and women have contraceptive responsibilities as well as contraceptive
rights.

This position is not explicitly argued, though almost without

exception feminists condemn those women who use abortion as a method of
birth control.

The implicit assumption that abortion is morally dif-

ferent from mechanical means of contraception, and the explicit assumption
that abortion is an unqualified right has created an ambivalence about

abortion which, if examined, can illuminate some of the weaknesses in the
liberal position.
The demand by feminists that women treat decisions to abort with

moral gravity makes sense only if they assume, on some level, that the
fetus is a person worthy of respect.

This implicit assumption of fetal

personhood creates ambivalence about the decision to abort which is
apparently quite common.

There is a strain in trying to maintain that

abortion is an unqualified right of women while in practice acting as if
it is a serious decision which should be qualified by a consideration of

the life inside the pregnant woman.

This ambivalence extends to the

general reluctance of feminists to accept and condone the practical,
logical implications of some of their arguments.
aborAs Paul Ramsey observes, most good arguments for unrestricted

tion are also good arguments for infanticide.

Yet, philosophers like

include arguMichael Tooley, who do draw out the abortion arguments to
and fewer in pracments for infanticide, have few supporters in theory

tice

.
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Tooley argues, for example, that the feminist argument
that women

have the right to rid themselves of that which is dependent
upon them
must also include the breastfed infant (particularly the infant
whose
survival depends on breast milk for nourishment)

.

In fact, most newborns

are as dependent upon the mother for their survival outside the womb
as

they were inside it.

So,

logically, this argument for abortion should

include the option of infanticide. 27
The same is true of the requirement set by many feminists that

abortion can be performed without restriction on the developing fetus

because it has not yet acquired the status of personhood which entitles
it to the right of life.

"self-consciousness
Yet,

Personhood, for most feminists, is defined as

.

it is hard to argue, says Tooley, that the newborn baby has

any more self-consciousness than the infant in utero

.

In fact, it often

takes months for the infant to establish that it is a being independent

of its mother.

Yet, only one feminist

I

have encountered supports infant

cide as a logical implication of feminist abortion arguments (and her

support is very qualified in practice)

28
.

Even Tooley won't condone

the killing of toddlers, though that is certainly compatible with his

requirement of legitimate infanticide.
This weakness in the popularized version of pro-abortionism accen-

tuates aspects of it which can be criticized.

First, the failure to

include the implicit assumption of fetal personhood as a premise in the

argument for elective abortion contributes to the public legitimation
of abortion as a method of contraception of first resort and not a pro-

cedure which kills a living being.

This legitimation is at odds with
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feminists' insistence that women treat the decision to abort as a
moral

decision and the withdrawal of legitimacy could reduce abortions substantially.
Second, although most pro-abortionists assume, on some level, that
the fetus is a creature worthy of at least grave consideration before it
is killed,

the assumption is at odds with the 1973 Supreme Court decisions

which are always used to justify the existence of elective abortion.
These decisions cannot justify even the feminist argument that women

should "agonize" before they abort.

The decisions have almost no legal,

medical, philosophical, religious, or scientific supporters, and it is

worth detailing why this is so.
Baruch Brody has argued that while it was the intention of the
Supreme Court to stay neutral about the humanity of the fetus, its
decisions assume, in fact, that the early fetus is not human.

29

The

Court's decision that because those trained in the discipline of
theology, philosophy, and medicine were unable to arrive at a consensus

on the status of the unborn fetus, there are no grounds for establishing

personhood, was very weak.

Even prominent pro-abortionists have rejected

it.

Bernard Nathanson is the most prominent, perhaps, of the supporters
of elective abortion to reconsider his position and push publicly for more

conservative laws.

He, and others like him, have been affected by recent

developments in fetology (fetal development) to which the Court had access,
but which the Justices chose not to include in their decisions.
Those working in the field of fetology have established that within

eighteen days after conception, the fetal heart begins to work.

By the
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fortieth day, there is brain activity.

By the tenth week, the fetus is

able to move its own arms and legs, and suck its thumb, swallow
amniotic
fluid, squint and make a fist.

The fetus,

from very early on, has most,

if not all, of the capacities which the late fetus and newborn infant

have
The Court argued that the state does have some obligations to protect
the "viable" fetus, which it stated came into existence in the twenty-

fourth week of pregnancy.

But Brody and Nathanson suggest that there are

at least two major weaknesses in this position.

The first is that,

since the fetus which can survive outside the womb is not significantly

different from that which cannot, the Court actually made no contribution
to establish grounds for personhood, and ignored evidence which could have

laid a solid foundation for future decisions.
The second major weakness was in using the concept "viability" at
all.

Advances in the field of fetology have suggested for quite some

time that "viability" is a much more fluid concept than these lawmakers
suggest.

In the early 1970 's, for example, it was possible to save

routinely a twenty-seven week old (two pound)

fetus, while it is not

uncommon now to save fetuses much smaller than two pounds.
The viability of the fetus is much better established in terms of
its weight (in grains)

and the availability of resources to save it.

(The same infant may be viable in one location but not in another hospital

in the same city.)

What is more, Nathanson argues that in making their decision about
as did
the viability of the fetus, the Justices used the same evidence

weeks.
the New York Legislature to arrive at the age of twenty-four
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(In both instances, he says,

the decision-makers merely "split the

difference" between Old English Common Law which set viability at

twenty-eight weeks, and the old New York law which set it at twenty
weeks.

"^°)

The Court's decisions were strictly political compromises

with no moral import.

This is surely at odds with the implicit

assumptions of most pro-abortionists.
Finally, the tendency of most pro-abortionists to insinuate that

working class anti-abortionism is a product of ignorance and manipulation, may well contribute toward pushing these people further to the

Right than they would really prefer to go.
The assumption that traditional family forms are totally repressive,

that religious beliefs are superstitious and those who have them are

victims of the powerful, and that religious beliefs, even if accorded
some legitimacy, should not be acted upon in the political sphere, have
done more to push people to the New Right than they have done to push

them to the Left.

Anyone who has spent time with working class people would know that
there are, at the very least, some joys to family life, some pleasures in

bearing and rearing children; and that working class women have many ways
to work around spouses that are "paternalistic."

And the across-the-board

denigration of religious beliefs and insistence that it cannot be expressed

politically is both ungenerous to human and religious history (to say
the least)

and an affront to principles of religious tolerance.

Finally, the tendencies of contemporary liberals, like Dworkin,
New Right
Hunter, and Gordon, to accord little or no legitimacy to the

men and
might have the unintentional consequence of encouraging more
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women in that direction.
For while these writers understand that the New Right, on one level
at least, appeals to traditional family values, patriotism, the impor-

tance of religious beliefs, they do not entertain the possibility that
these beliefs might well be legitimate, even necessary to a particular

way of life.
This tendency to interpret the New Right as irrational is particularly

evident, as

I

have argued, in their approach to anti-abortionism.

These

liberals characterize it, and its proponents, as inhumane or ignorant,

dismissing the respect for the unborn which most often energizes antiabortionists

.

Traditional working class people already find little or no institutional support for their beliefs in a society guided by liberal theory
and practice; and policies based on interpretations like Dworkin, Gordon,
and Hunter's are likely to encourage their move to groups which accord
some legitimacy to their beliefs.

This occurs, even if on another level,

the New Right is dangerously superficial and insulated.
In the absence of an alternative expression of the beliefs which

support a traditional way of life, and with the realistic expectation
that these beliefs will be misinterpreted and treated with hostility by

contemporary liberals

,

we can expect more and more working class people

to be attracted to the New Right.

The most promising possibility for countering the dangers of the
liberals
Right, as well as the sterility of the abortion debate, lies in

re-engaging in debate some of the beliefs which comprise the working
class way of life.
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.

Summary

To sum, then, the 1973 Supreme Court decisions on abortion encouraged

pro-abortionists to cut off debate with anti-abortionists.
reasons for arguing that this may have been premature.

There are good

The popularized

version of pro-abortionism is subject to criticism which, if confronted,

might suggest areas such as stressing contraceptive responsibility, and
the personhood of the fetus, which could encourage both pro- and anti-

abortionists to compromise.
A more in depth appreciation and critique of the popularized version
of anti-abortionism suggests that the areas for compromise might be

greater than most participants would suspect as one explores the ways

pro-abortionists are implicitly dependent on the traditional family life
their position challenges.
chapter.

I

shall concentrate on this in my next
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CHAPTER

IV

THE IMPLICIT SIDE OF PRO-ABORTIONISM:
A CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM

There is a liberal vision implicit in most pro-abortion arguments

which is largely unexplored.

Examining the vision is important because

the implicit aspects of it are at odds with other, more prominent

features of the vision.
In this chapter,

I

shall explore this feature of pro-abortionism

by focusing on two prominent pro-abortionists:
and Garrett Hardin.

Thompson is

Judith Jarvis Thompson

feminist and philosopher at Massa-

a

chusetts Institute of Technology who has written extensive justifications
for the right of women to abortion on demand.

Hardin is a biologist who

is widely acknowledged as a defender of abortion rights.

The two complement one another

-

Thomson focusing on a defense of

individual rights, and Hardin concentrating on the non-personhood of
the fetus

(at least in its early states of development)

and the demographic

necessity of elective abortion.
I

shall argue that both celebrate a vision of liberalism that has

implicit social requirements which escape both and which could undermine
that vision.

And

I

shall argue that both Hardin and Thompson, assuming the

neutrality of the social observer, have, in fact, universalized their own
positions and misinterpreted other ways of life.

Finally,

I

shall

suggest that the implicit side of liberalism could, if acknowledged,

contribute toward the development of a morally
promise which would receive broad support.
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Garrett Hardin

Garrett Hardin's arguments for abortion are particularly compelling
to explore because he insists upon what many other feminists and popula-

tion planners only imply.

The explicitness of his position enables us to

explore at length an issue which is an increasing embarrassment to proabortionists, particularly population planners.

This is the fact that

having argued for so long that all women have the right to reproductive
freedom of choice, they are now suggesting (because the population did not

significantly decrease) that reproductive freedom is more

a

privilege

than a right.
This dilemma is instructive because it illuminates the way pro-

abortionists, particularly planners, rely on traditional values which

their explicit policies undermine.

Let us consider Hardin's arguments

for abortion.

The tone, the stress, of Hardin's arguments for abortion have

shifted dramatically in the last decade as have the tone and stress of
the family and population planning organizations he often represents.

From arguing that women should be allowed to have abortions for their
own well-being and the good of society, Hardin has begun to argue that

women should be forced to have abortions, perhaps be sterilized, when the

population cannot bear any more growth.
Hardin acknowledges that he has made some changes in his "policy
(when
recommendations" because women did not rush to have abortions

services for them were made widely available)
to check the population growth.

in numbers great enough
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Hardin concludes that women are acting selfishly and that the
state has the right, indeed the duty, to coerce women to act in
the

public interest.

Hardin is currently working for laws which would force

women to become sterilized after each had had

child.

He insists

that women undergo the procedure because "divorce and remarriage have

played havoc with assigning responsibility to men.
responsible

Biology makes women

.

Hardin is aware that his policy for sterilization can be thought
of as a limitation of freedom, but he argues that freedom is really
"the recognition of necessity."

And it is necessary that women cease

reproducing at the current rate.
The state has a right to make such a policy because it assumes a

significant part of the costs of childrearing and because the chromosomes
given to the child at conception are not merely the parents but are
"only part of the community's store."

2

There are two keys to understanding what encouraged Hardin to move
from a position which, at least implicitly, characterizes women as

irresponsible citizens.
capacity."

The first is his notion of society's "carrying

The "carrying capacity" is the level in a society at which

the population and resources available to keep it thriving are equal.
Now, according to Hardin, some societies are reckless in their

attempts to equalize resources and those who make use of them.

societies have stern choices to make:

These

either they can continue in the

inevitably
current direction, taxing their "carrying capacity" and moving
to limit
toward mass starvation and death; or they can force members

population growth through sterilization, abortion, euthanasia.
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According to Hardin, there is a direct correlation
between the
standard of living desired and the
society:

nuirODer

of people in any particular

the higher the desired standard of living, the
fewer people

the society will be able to successfully accoiranodate

"Higher," for

.

Hardin, in interpreted as higher levels of education, technology,

energy usage, skill differentiation.
Those who try to tamper with the Hardin's law of "carrying

capacity" will be undermined by it.

So,

for example,

who insist upon aiding countries where starvation is

those altruists,
a

persistent

problem, are only prolonging an inevitable collapse and jeopardizing
their own standards of living.

Difficult as it may be for such altru-

ists to swallow, such countries can be helped only by allowing their

least able members to die.

Hardin argues that nature does not tolerate the weak, and intelligent human beings should not either.
It should be clear by now that a belief in the 'sanctity
of life' find no support in Nature, if that belief is
the justification for cherishing the life of each and every
individual human being above all goods. As far as Nature
is concerned, the individual life is cheap, very cheap.
Nature (to continue the personification) seeks to conserve
something much more subtle.
It may be that human policy
should be dominated by the concept of the sanctity of
life (though Hardin thinks it would be irrational to act
in this way) but if so, not with the support of biology.-^

Though Hardin's views might not on reflection be embraced by other

population planners, they make explicit assumptions other planners hold
only implicitly.

Most planners assiame with Hardin, for example, that

upper class Americans have the highest standard of living in the world,
and that our "carrying capacity" should be one with more of these highly
educated, highly paid, highly consumption-oriented citizens.

They
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emphasize curtailing the number and controlling for the quality of
citizenry, rather than scaling down consumption and encouraging other

standards of "the good life."

Hardin and others also assume no connection between hunger and
shortages in other nations and our own abundance,

Hardin insists that

Americans have simply been more shrewd and more realistic about devel-

oping a high quality "carrying capacity."
Most family and population planners also assume, with Hardin, that

attempts by the state to shape our "carrying capacity" in specific

directions will place the same burdens on all citizens, since they
assiame that all would benefit equally from higher standards and are

equally disadvantaged when the population grows beyond a certain limit.
These ass\imptions have encouraged planners to assume that most

citizens would be only too willing to do what is necessary to limit

growth and thereby improve the quality of their lives.
These assumptions have encouraged them as well to investigate only

minimally the public response to abortion on demand.

Most planners

assume citizens would, of course, support such a policy.
these assxamptions

,

Working with

most family and population planners are beginning to

argue that those who continue to oppose elective abortion laws are acting

irrationally
Most planners appear to share Hardin's convictions about America's
public-spirited,
ideal "carrying capacity," as well as his assumption that

most humane
sensible citizens would embrace elective abortion as the

means for achieving this ideal.

Faced with increasing intransigence on

population growth, many
the part of anti-abortionists, and continued

,
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planners have joined Hardin in his shift of emphasis away from the

humanity of abortion to its necessity

.

And women, once viewed as vic-

tims of male dominance and religious fanaticism are increasingly

viewed as menaces to the well-being of American society.
The second key to understanding this shift is in the apparent con-

tradiction in Hardin's arguments for abortion on demand.
On the one hand,

for example, Hardin states that the only one with

any right to make the decision to continue her pregnancy is the preg-

nant woman herself.
No one, I will argue, whether husband, parent, father of
her child, or a representative of the community, should have
the slightest right to deny her.
The right to abortion
should be hers and hers alone.

And

There should not be the slightest communal concern when
a woman elects to destroy the life of her thousand-of-anounce embryo.^
Hardin justifies his argument by claiming that pregnancy and child-

birth are forms of servitude which eat up "the best years of

a

woman's

life," and that women cannot be forced into slavery in a ^ust society.
On the other hand, Hardin suggests that,

Whatever our personal tastes in sex education for the future,
that we must more and more
surely this much is clear:
emphasize the non-right of the individual woman to continue
a pregnancy in utter disregard for the significant persons
her parents, boyfriend, or her husband, and
in her life:
even society as a whole, since many of the costs of rearing
and educating a child must be borne by society at large.
These at least she must consider: but above all these she
must consider the interest of the child who will come into
being if she allows the pregnancy to continue.
at
If the total circumstances are such that the child born
will
circumstances
particular
a particular time and under a
she
not receive a fair shake in life, then she should know,

6
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should feel in her bones
continue her pregnancy."^

-

that she has no right to

On the face of it at least, it seems as though Hardin is arguing

both that the mother has an absolute right to decide whether or not to
continue her pregnancy and also that she does not.
be clarified,

I

Hardin's claims can

think, by examining some of the assiamptions only implicit

in his arguments.

Hardin's claims are held together by the implicit assumption that
in every society there is a common good and that after a fashion most

members will recognize what it is and act in accordance with its fulfill-

ment

.

With respect to abortion, as

I

have already suggested, Hardin assumes

that the best society is one in which all children are wanted by their

mothers and by those others burdened with their support.
of quoting Margaret Sanger:

Hardin is fond

"The first right of every child is to be

wanted, to be desired, to be planned, with an intensity of love that
gives it its title to being."

Hardin says, too, that the welfare of the
.

.

potential child is the most important criterion in the decision to abort.

8

Now, consider the hypothetical decision-making process of a pregnant

woman acting on Hardin's assumptions.

The woman does not take her preg-

nancy for granted, but considers above all else whether or not the child
is really wanted.

A child that is really wanted

,

Hardin implies, is when all of those

involved in its future rearing and support are able and willing to give
it all it needs to lead a quality of life.

This means that the child

must have a better- than-average chance of being healthy and intelligent,
and must not be

a

financial, physical, or emotional burden on its parents.

80

grandparents, or the state.
In order to make this important decision (and it is hers
to make)

the woman must first imagine this young fetus as her future child.

She

must envision her life and that of her parents and spouse as it would

probably unfold with this child.
She considers, too, the ability of the state to provide the re-

sources her child will need to lead a "quality" life.

She must ask if

there are enough schools, jobs, recreational facilities for this child,

and if they are of good quality.

Presumably, after the pregnant woman has thought through the future

of her fetus with respect to all those largely involved in its care, she
will "feel in her bones" whether or not she should carry it to term.
Let us consider now, at another level, what Hardin assises this

woman will do.

He assumes that she will be willing and able to form an

imaginary relationship with her fetus, even more, that she will have
enough affection and respect for it that she would not allow it to be

born unless it had a high probability of sustaining not only her love and
regard but also those of its immediate caretakers.
In brief, she must take into careful consideration the probable

future of an unborn child and imagine its probable relationships and

experiences with its future world.

She must be capable of forming a

bond, however tenuous, with her unborn child and of assessing its

probable future in the community.
Next, Hardin assumes that the woman has ties with her natural

family and that they have obligations toward her potential child.

These

that the pregties, moreover, are sufficiently solid and affectionate

81

nant woman would be able to judge accurately their willingness
and ability
to support this child in the necessary ways.

He is assuming here that the

society and the social relationships which characterize it are stable

enough that the mother is able to predict with some certainty the future
of her unborn child.

Finally, Hardin assumes that the potential mother is an intelligent

and loyal citizen.

She is capable of judging the state's ability to

care for this particular child.

And she is sufficiently dutiful as a

citizen that she can balance her own wishes against those of members of

her society and act in the common good

-

which may or may not be compatible

with her own particular desires.
Hardin assumes, to sum, that the pregnant woman is able to empathize with others and that she is able to put their collective needs

above her own individual desires, at least in important instances.

She

is able to make important moral decisions with a degree of selflessness.

She is able to form bonds with her unborn child and to make a reasonably

accurate assessment of its future.

Hardin assumes, too, that the mother will make the "right" decision

with respect to her fetus.

The decision will be so obvious, once she

has reflected sufficiently that she will, says Hardin, "feel it in her

bones

.

So, when Hardin argues that it is the mother who has the ultimate

and absolute right to decide whether or not to abort, he is assuming that
future
the decision will be made on the basis of how wanted it is by its

caretakers and that most pregnant women are qualified to make this

assessment
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Most decisions to abort, in Hardin's view, are made to spare
the

child an unfair life and its caretakers a burden.
Now, the right to decide is contingent upon, based upon, the assump-

tion that the mother has these qualities of other regard and intelligence,

and that she brings them to bear in her decision to abort.

mothers without these qualities do not have the right.

Presumably,

This, though,

is only implicit in Hardin's thought.
It is easy to get the impression, at first, that Hardin's theory

of rights is based on individualist principles:

the woman, after all,

is granted the right to decide without any interference from others.

But when we explore what Hardin sees as essential to any decision to
abort, we see that he actually assumes that a profoundly social exper-

ience underpins the right to decide.
In Hardin's view, the right to decide is based on the woman's capa-

city and willingness to respond to family and community needs and wants
and to those of her future child, as well as to her own wants and needs.
This is why a woman does not take into account all of these, forfeits her right to decide in Hardin's view.

What is more, we can expect

that should it be in the interests of society, any particular society,
to expand its population, most women would be willing to support the

expansion with decisions not to abort.
Hardin himself does not suggest or explore what social situations,
practices, and institutions, encourage the qualities he assumes most
citizens possess.

But we can state that there must be at least a certain

of social
amount of stability in social relationships and a slow rate

predict their
change if these women are going to be able really to

unborn 's future.

There must as well be considerable legitimacy to

the state.

Implicit in Hardin's vision is an ideal of family life where
families are stable, loyal to other members, and rarely disrupted
by changes in traditions and convention; where families are encouraged
to maintain their privacy with the reasonable assurances that they will

rarely be interfered with by the state, whose largest responsibility
is to protect and preserve the way of life.

On the other hand, Hardin is committed to policies which inhibit
the maintenance of that way of life.

In The Limits of Altruism

Hardin

,

commits himself to policies of equal opportunity, unlimited growth,

unrestrained exploitation of our natural resources, and the widest
possible extension of individual rights.

9

And, particularly

m

his

early defense of abortion, Hardin celebrates the liberal view of family
life which Alan Carlson nicely elaborates.

Carlson argues that in their attempts to be fair, liberals have

allowed "any human relationship involving cohabitation that produces

self-gratification and sexual fulfillment some claim to valid family
status.

""'"^

The concepts of "immorality" or "deviant family behavior"

have no purchase in the explicit liberal agenda.
The liberal agenda celebrates these values for family life:
1.

2.

There are no constants in moral questions
Mutability.
nor in personal relationships.

There should be no bias towards marriage and
Choice.
Everything is open. All habitual and culchildren.
tural attitudes may be questioned. All values are on
trial
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3-

Experimentation
Since there are no family or sexual
norms, no traditions worthy of universal emulation, and
no restraints persons must be free to experiment with a
variety of sexual partners and practices to find the
sexual and family lifestyles appropriate for themselves.
.

,

4.

Self- fulfillment
Morality demands freedom for people
to realize their own potentials - and their own needs,
desires, and tastes - with a minimum of social rules and
regulations.
Relationships should last only so long as
they are mutually self-fulfilling.

5.

Uninhibited sexuality
Sexual gratification represents
one of life's ultimate values. Access to regular sexual
gratification should be viewed as a basic human right.
There is no true humanness devoid of sexuality.

5.

The problem of children
Sexuality must be viewed as
totally separated from procreation. Parenthood should be
undertaken only after a careful weighing of social, cultural, and economic costs.
The burden of social proof
is shifted away from the right of persons to procreate.
Given the problem of overpopulation, reproduction may have
to be viewed as a privilege granted by a government working
towards the goals of decreasing the quantity while increasing
Unwanted pregnancies should be
the quality of humankind.
aborted.

.

.

.

At least some aspects of the liberal agenda for the family endorse

ways of life which celebrate individual fulfillment over long-term commitment; immediate pleasure over the sometimes turbulent task of childrearing

abandonment of all norms over the pursuit of a particular ideal.
There are good reasons for arguing that explicit liberal agenda is

incompatible with the maintenance of strong social bonds, loyalty to

other generations and the state, and feelings of affection and concern
for the unborn.

The policies which flow from the liberal agenda are

arrangements.
incompatible with, yet dependent upon, traditional social

unattainability
The two undermine one another and suggest the ultimate
of the larger vision from which they flow.
tunity,

The policy of equal oppor-

locations where
for example, encourages workers to move to
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available jobs match their talents

- a

policy which encourages a

loosening of family and community bonds and obligations (as members,

continually uprooted, are less pressured and less able to participate
in extended family and local community problems)

.

Such policies, in

practice, tend to erode the loyalty and capacities for long-term and

affectionate judgment which Hardin implicitly assumes are necessary for
the good liberal citizen.

His commitment to full exploitation of our natural resources, too,
is often at the expense of the predictable day-to-day shape of communi-

ties, and can contribute to dramatic reshaping and impoverishments of

communities as its wealthier members leave to escape the damage which
often accompanies such exploitation.
In the same way, policies which encourage widespread individual

rights can erode the natural bonds of affection between parents and
children, husbands and wives.

George Kateb suggests that liberalism seems to require

a

"continuous

identity" to function, and yet it undermines the possibility of its

attainment

12

Kateb argues that a continuous identity enables citizens to identify

with the experiences of persons who have gone before them and who will
follow them.

Such continuous identification encourages those who live

now to preserve and protect the way of life for future generations.
This identity is fostered by slow changes in the way of life, by a

minimum of mobility and by strong kinship ties.

The identity is solidi-

by law
fied by beliefs in human uniqueness, beliefs which are nurtured

and social policy.

.
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This sense of uniqueness is being eroded by many liberal programs.

Space exploration has established the seeming immensity of the universe,

which weakens the uniqueness of people on earth.

The vastness of modern

warfare, the scale of human and material destruction, coupled with modern

weapons in which the killers never see their victims, encourages a loss
of identification with the experiences of others:
as the reality of human beings as persons grows
visible - whether to the Pentagon bureaucrat or
agents - the sense of life as what human beings
weakens, and a-1 sorts of violence becomes more

less
their
share
likely.

Liberal programs which encourage government delivery of services

unwittingly undermine longstanding identities and obligations of neighbors, families, and community organizations who previously assumed respon-

sibility for the provision of basic needs.
So,

too, the general expansion of experiences available to people

through technological and psychological investigation has diminished,

rather than enriched, our capacities for self and species

-

respect by

emphasizing the transitory character of our social and self-identities
and our experiences

Many liberal programs assumed to enhance the quality of life diminish
it in practice by disturbing the relatively unchanging features of social

life and practices which make rich social relationships possible in the

first instance.

The success of the programs (such as abortion on demand)

as an
is dependent upon the existence of a strong sense of oneself

strengindividual member of a community who can make choices which will

arrangements which
then both; but the programs themselves promote social
cultivate.
make such identifications increasingly difficult to

There is
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an implicit side to Hardin's liberalism which is
unacknowledged in his

defense of abortion on demand.

This implicit side is typical of most

family and population planners and feminists.

When the underside is not

made explicit, it encourages pro-abortionists to misunderstand,
and

criticize those who choose not to support liberalized abortion laws.

Hardin is the most prominent example of this tendency, perhaps, but it
exists for most pro-abortionists.

Perhaps one of the most valuable results of a re-engagement of
liberals with anti-abortionists in the controversy would be acknowledg-

ment of this aspect.
Finally, Hardin insists upon and claims that his position on abortion
is an objective one which any neutral observer could accept.

In actuality,

however, Hardin has universalized his own way of life.
The celebration of affluence, of technological advance, of the small

number but well-educated offspring, are certainly not prominent features of

working class family life.
The social sciences, as

sciences.

I

have already argued, are interpretive

The social scientist has accepted some assumptions about human

nature and rejected others, whether or not she makes this explicit.

Hardin cannot claim that his are neutral observations.

So,

In his particular

case, he could strengthen the plausibility of his claim by opposing them
to others, and gauging whether or not his claims make more sense.

Though

this will not give a definitive interpretation (this cannot be a goal in
the social sciences)

,

it can guard against interpretations which have no

rational basis whatsoever.

And it can protect the interpreter from

universalizing his or her own way of life and hence misinterpreting others.

.
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Judith Jarvis Thompson

Judith Thompson, like Garrett Hardin, has tried to
illuminate some
of the less-discussed aspects of the pro-abortion
position.

And her work,

like Hardin's, is particularly instructive for the way it
suggests the

poverty of the liberalism it explicitly celebrates.

Consider, for

example, her defense of the right to abortion.

Thompson argues that the right to life is not nearly so unproblematic as right-to-lif ers would have us believe.

More specifically,

Thompson's argument is that "having a right to life does not guarantee

having a right to be given the use of another's body
fetus)

needs it for life itself."

-

even if (the

14

The right to life consists "not in the right not to be killed, but

rather in the right not to be killed unjustly.""*"^

An unjust killing,

presumably, is one in which the mother kills her fetus after having

invited it to make use of her body, and the fetus, once conceived, does
not threaten her physical or emotional health.

Or, more simply, having

the right to life, and being able to continue to live, are not the same

things
The right to life, says Thompson, is a natural right:

it exists

independently of whether or not it is actually granted by one human

being to another.

Whereas actually being given the means to sustain

life is something which must be willingly extended to one person by

another.

It is this, and only this explicit contraction for the care and

sustenance of another which is legally binding.

If,

for example, we

make a contract with another person to keep that person alive, we must
from
honor that contract unless extraordinary circumstances prevent us
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doing so.

If we do not fulfill that contract, we have killed unjustly.

On this view, it is not a contradiction to say that while a fetus has
a right to life,

its mother does not necessarily have to provide it with

what it needs to live.

Unless she has assumed, implicitly or explicitly,

"special responsibility" for fulfilling its right to life, she has no
legal responsibility for keeping it alive.

If-

she does abort the fetus,

she has not killed unjustly and she has not violated its right to life.

According to Thompson, even if a mother has accepted responsibility
explicitly for caring for her fetus, she is no longer legally obligated
to carry it to term if this would require large sacrifices of her.

Thompson's main purpose in defending "rights" in this way is to

separate from the concept any notion of "ought."
is not a moral concept.

For Thompson, "rights"

Although some people do use the term in such a

way that it follows from it that a right ought to be granted, Thompson
considers this "an unfortunate loosening of what we would do better to

keep a tight rein

on.""*"^

She is challenging those who argue, for

example, that since the fetus has a right to life, and since it must

exist within the mother in order to live, the mother "ought" to let it
do so

Although Thompson agrees that there may be times when a person
ought to do something, when "it would be callous, self-centered and
indecent to refuse" (for example, to let another use my body for an
and not
hour when this brief use of it would save that person's life

endanger my own)
request.

I

,

I

would not be acting unjustly if

have not killed unjustly (even though

can keep this person alive) unless

I

I

I

refused the

am the only one who

have agreed at some point that his
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welfare is my burden.

Outside of such a contract, this person can make

no claim on me to grant his right to life.

But this conception of rights is problematic for several reasons.

First of all, in our ordinary use of the concept "rights" we do not sever
from it any notion of moral responsibility.

When we say that someone

has a right to something, we are also saying that unless there are

overriding reasons, there is an obligation to provide for the exercise
of that right.
itself.

The contract for exercision is built into the concept

The obligation to honor the exercision of that right does not,

in our ordinary use of that term, exist apart from the right (as Thompson

would have

it)

so that first, there are rights, and then perhaps

,

some

obligation to fulfill them.
The concept "rights" in our ordinary use of it, is formed from the

moral point of view.

There is a rich background of moral claims, duties,

responsibilities, on which rights are built, upon which the concept
depends.

The moral point of view is built into the concept rights so

that it is nonsensical to suggest that we have rights but no reason to

expect them honored.

When Thompson severs the connection between rights and morality, she
forces us to ask the point of rights in her scheme.

She is using the

concept in a way we ordinarily do not, and we should expect

a

justifica-

tion for her preferred usage.
from the
Second, even if we assume that the concept is not formed

problematic.
moral point of view, Thompson's account is still

For she

has assumed "special
assumes that it will be relatively easy to decide who

responsibility" for their fulfillment and who has not.

But in the examples
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Thompson uses of where there is a question of legal responsibility
(when,

for example, a mother who originally wanted her child aborts

it when she is eight months pregnant)

Thompson implies that we must

"fall back" on our traditional moral standards of what appropriate

behavior should be.

Thompson makes implicit use of a connection between

morality and rights which she explicitly denies.
Consider, for example, her argument that in some instances it

would be "morally indecent," though not a violation of its rights, for
a

pregnant woman to abort her fetus.

Thompson argues that it would be

morally indecent for a pregnant woman to abort her seven month old
fetus to enjoy more fully a Caribbean cruise, or for a rape victim to

abort her thirty-eight week old

fetus."^"^

Similarly, she argues that it would be morally indecent if

refused to save your life when all

I

I

had to do to save you would be to

walk ten yards to you and touch your head.

We expect that

I

would make

such a minimal effort for such a maximum benefit, but neither you
nor the victim has a right to expect a minimum of decency from me.

But in these examples, Thompson is trading in on ideas and beliefs
most of us share about the way our way of life should be.

These ideas

and beliefs are moral in the sense that they are important features of

our prized way of life and without them our way of life would be some-

thing less

-

coarser, less decent.

changes
Often these moral requirements change in response to other
some of them never
in the way of life; some of them seem never to change;

become part of the legal system.

They are, instead, woven into the fabric

tradition.
of our society through custom, convention,

Living by these

.
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is an important feature of the way of life - even
though they are not

always part of the legal system.

Thompson argues that everyday civilities we accord one
another
continue to exist alongside our more formal rights.

her use of "morally indecent" in this way.

We can understand

She can make no connection,

though, between these "moral indecencies" and the proper exercise of

rights. Thompson embraces a legalistic, individualistic, conception

of rights which is at odds with the social practice of rights.
Consider, for example, Hegel's criticisms of the utilitarian model
of rights Thompson adopts.

In civil society, Hegel claims, men relate

to one another as individuals and as individual bearers of rights.

Each

individual seeks his or her own fulfillment, though this requires working

with others
But Hegel cautioned against sole identification with civil society.

Without some identification beyond civil society, individuals can be
expected to lose their sense of self-respect and respect for others,
and become a "heap" or "rabble."

Civil society is kept in balance only by its members identifying

with others at different levels

-

both in the family (where members share

love and commitments based on feeling) and through the state.

A society based on utilitarian principles alone could not survive.

Modern societies like our own where utilitarian principles are encouraged
and expressed in many of our institutions and practices carry on by

"coasting" on traditional allegiances to them and the way of life they
symbolize; and by creating visions which transcend the mere consideration
of utility which are its supposed official guide.
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Thompson's expression of an individualist conception of
rights
depends implicitly on the woman's (in the case of abortion)
under-

standing and use of traditional, extra-legal, moral practices.

Thomp-

son assumes, for example, that the absolute right of the mother to

destroy her fetus is accompanied by a sense of decency which will

discourage the wanton destruction of early life.
But the structures for developing this sense of decency,

I

shall

argue more fully below, are undermined, weakened, by the individualist,

truncated policies Thompson celebrates.

She condones a way of life in

which, for example, the father of an unborn child has no right to decide

whether or not it shall live; yet she is confident that, should the
unborn child need its father for a blood transfusion, he would gladly
oblige
Her explicit celebration of individual rights, often at the

expense of traditional family life, assumes implicitly the durable,
loving bonds of traditional family life.

Her legalism is dependent

upon moral custom even as it jeopardizes it.
Strict attention to one level, that of individual rights, moreover,
keeps the analysis of social life at a very abstract level.

This can

encourage a misunderstanding of the effects of individual rights in more
concrete social practices.
I

have mentioned already the ways in which the right to elective

abortion has become for many the obligation to abort.

This change has

also occurred with the right to die and the right to amniocentesis.

Amniocentesis, for example, is promoted as that test which enables
families to produce only the healthiest of children, a particular

.
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benefit to those parents who already have a Down's
Syndrome child.

In

this procedure, fluid is taken from the amniotic sac to test
for genetic

abnormalities
Its acceptance by parents implies an acceptance of new,
liberal

standards of health, standards which exclude those infants with handicaps of most sorts.

The very existence of amniocentesis, of the state's willingness
(indeed, eagerness)

to subsidize it, and the state's responsibility

(in most instances)

for subsidizing the care of Down's Syndrome children,

contribute to pressuring parents into considering the right to amniocentesis as the obligation to undergo it.
I

know from personal experience the pressures medical authorities

can and do put on the parents of a Down's Symdrome child not to chance
the birth of another one.

This pressure, in turn, can contribute to

changes in the shape of the family relationship.
Paul Ramsey suggests, for example, that the bond of trust between

parents and child is weakened by the very decision to undergo amniocentesis.

For the parents must contemplate seriously the destruction of

their offspring before the test is even administered.

The mere considera-

tion weakens the parental identity as protectors of their offspring.

19

The parent-child bond of trust is also jeopardized if there are

siblings involved.

If the parents are undergoing amniocentesis because

an existing child has a genetic defect, this child might well think that

her parents would have preferred, had they had the opportunity, to abort
her.
a

The bond of trust might be eroded as well when the child born after

negative amniocentesis test is informed of the test when she is older.
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Ramsey argues that the parent-child bond of unquestioned
affection

and trust, which sustains the relationship throughout
a lifetime, is

diminished in its quality and content by the very decision to
undergo
amniocentesis.

In his interviews with parents in the process of
under-

going the procedure, Ramsey found that most distanced themselves from
the nascent child prior to a notification of the results, and none

would even consider the possibility of a false diagnosis of Down's
Syndrome (and therefore the abortion of a normal infant)

Analagous observations have been made about the decision to abort.
The very consideration of the destruction of the nascent life weakens
the bond between parent and child (and may well weaken the relationship

between parents and other children).
a New York abortion clinic,

In Magda Dene's observations in

for example, many women six to seven months

pregnant, were claiming that they had never felt fetal movement, even

though most women feel the fetus quite strongly by the fifth month of
pregnancy.

The disassociation from the fetus was so great, or the need

to disassociate was so essential to the consideration of abortion, that

many women acted, literally, as if there were no life there.

20

This distancing and weakening of mother-child, parent-child bond

affects the way medical authorities treat the live births which often
result from late abortions.

In the absence of any indication that the

child is wanted by its parents, many doctors and nurses present at the
live births do not feel compelled to try to save the infants' lives.

one nurse said to me, "I know the mother doesn't want it, so

I

take my

time getting it to the intensive care nursery."
The situation at the other end of the spectrum

-

that of the

As
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terminally ill

- is similar.

The existence of life-support equipment,

the right to allow patients to die, changing standards which
prize the

painless death, the enormous cost of maintaining life-support equipment
and the burden of the cost being a state responsibility in most cases,

contribute to a deterioration of family bonds.
The medical authorities must be consulted; the cost to the sur-

vivors must be kept in mind; the family must weigh the emotional and

monetary cost of keeping a member alive against the amount of suffering
a

member is undergoing and against the wishes of the patient.
In all instances, that of amniocentesis, abortion, and elaborate

life-support systems, the existence of new technology and the pressure
to use it (encouraged by liberal standards of health)

can contribute to

a weakening of family bonds when they can withstand it least.

The existence of outside medical authorities to whom the family

must appeal, the pressure to view the right to the use of the new technology as an obligation to make use of it, diminishes the privacy of the
family unit, the confidence of its members to meet the needs of its sick
or disabled members, and the natural trust and affection that the members' welfare will always be a foremost consideration.

The sense of and capacity for responsibility diminishes not only

with the availability of and pressure to make use of new technology,
but also in conjunction with the results of other aspects of liberal
ideology.

It is difficult to care for one's elderly parents,

for example,

when doing so would mean moving to an area where employment opportunities

would diminish one's income and perhaps the possibility of providing
adequate care.
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When discussions of individual rights remain at an abstract level
they miss the changes which often occur in everyday situations which

deform that right, often changing it to an obligation and diminishing
the social bonds of those participating in that right.

The abstract quality of Thompson's work is dependent, too, on her

assumption that this abstract level of analysis ensures that her arguments are neutral.

In fact, she,

like Hardin, universalizes her own

beliefs
The casualness of her treatment of the person who would refuse
to do the bare minimum to save another's life would certainly horrify

most of those outside the university circles of speculation, as would
giving priority to individual rights over family stability threaten

many working class and traditional people.

Thompson's strict

individualism, while popular, is not neutral, but a reflection of her

own assumptions and beliefs about "the good society."

3

.

Conclusion

The explicitness of Garrett Hardin and Judith Jarvis Thompson's

remarks have helped to illuminate the weaknesses and dilemmas of the

pro-abortionists' position.

They show how this position is dependent,

in part, upon a set of practices and beliefs which are part of the

working class ideal, which are incompatible with the more individualist
aspects of liberalism.
This ultimate incompatibility is a key reason for the participants
in the abortion controversy to compromise.

Pro-abortionists could, on

aspects of antireflection, see the inner rationality of at least some

abortionism.

.
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First, there is their refusal to draw a line establishing the

particular point of fetal development at which the fetus becomes a
person.

This is implicit in most pro-abortion arguments.

Even Planned

Parenthood, perhaps the most prominent group to support abortion on

demand and to deny the early personhood of the fetus

personhood only a decade or so ago.
tion asks:

"Is

(contraception)

,

celebrated its

In its 1964 brochure, the organiza-

abortion?

Definitely not.

kills the life of a baby after it has begun."

An abortion

21

And second, pro-abortionists could, on reflection, understand how

traditional family life has features which are important to the promotion
of morally developed and responsible citizens.

The pro-abortionists

would not have to grant total rationality to the traditional way of
life, but grant that it has some legitimacy and rationality to it.

These critiques of Thompson and Hardin (and in the larger sense,

pro-abortionism) could cultivate some ground for the anti-abortionists
to compromise

.

Perhaps though

,

they could not see completely the

legitimacy of a way of life which promotes broad individual rights,
they could see sufficient rationale to tolerate it.
In my final chapter,

compromise

I

shall explore the possibilities for
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CHAPTER

V

THE DIMENSIONS OF A COMPROMISE

1-

An Abstract Case For Compromise

In a policy which promotes competing ways of life there are bound
to be conflicts, such as that over abortion, which are not amenable to

simple negotiation.

Yet, these conflicts often evoke such intense

feelings and beliefs that all parties agree that a state policy is

needed to control the conflict.

The ability of the state to respond is

shaped, in part, by the ability of all parties to see, upon reflection,

some rationality to the opponent's way of life.
This rationality may not be immediately evident.

It is possible,

for example, for one party to find it difficult to see a plausible

defense of a competing way of life because the ideas and beliefs of
its participants have been widely misinterpreted.

Or perhaps, the

ideas and beliefs which support a particular position have not been

sufficiently publicly articulated.

An essential preliminary to the

settlement of such a conflict may be the public expression of the less

articulated position to ensure it as much coherence and rationality as
inspires it.
In such a conflict, there may be arguments and considerations on

both sides which are not resolvable, and it may well be that neither
side can understand the other side perfectly.

But, if there is some

mutual respect for the beliefs of all parties, and a shared belief that
there is a possibility of deep social disaffection resulting from the
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conflict which outweighs the necessity of perfect
compromise, the state
is

in a position to encourage a compromise.

The compromise may not speak to the highest ideals of
the society.
Its justification lies, instead, in the fact that all
parties agree that

no set of beliefs, or way of life, is without some justification,
and

that support is owed those public policies intended to maintain at
least
the minimum of integrity necessary to preserve all ways of life.

The

potential political compromise is morally justified even though it

probably will not be cause for moral celebration.

2.

The Specific Instance of Abortion

What, specifically, are the possibilities for compromise on abor-

tion policies in the United States?

There are, to be sure, intense

feelings and beliefs about the issues by all participants.

And there is

agreement on the need for a state policy to control contraceptive practice and abortion.

The dimensions of a compromise for which the state could expect

widespread support are set by two conditions.

The first is the willing-

ness and ability of the participants to try to understand why their

opponents see abortion as vitally affecting their way of life, and why
the way of life is so precious that abortion policy must be shaped to

protect it.

The second factor is the current role of the state in many

aspects of family life.
As

I

have argued, the major participants in the abortion contro-

versy seem to have very little understanding of and respect for the

positions of their opponents.

Pro-abortionists have misunderstood the
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role of the family in the working class way of life and
have failed to
see working class anti-abortionism as, in part, a defense
of that life.

They have not understood how their anti-abortionism is a rational
response to protect their sense of self.
The popularization of the pro-abortionist position that all or most

anti-abortionists are power-obsessed, women-hating, religious fanatics
has only increased the hostility and alienation of anti-abortionists and

diminished the grounds for compromise.
And the anti-abortionists, on the defensive but without acknowledged
grounds for compromise, have not sympathetically reviewed the beliefs of

pro-abortionists about the need to make abortion available.
The most promising approach to promoting a sympathetic dialogue

between the two parties is to delineate and insist upon, publicly, the
inner rationality of the less articulated (anti-abortionist) position, and
to call attention to aspects of the working class way of life which many

pro-abortionists implicitly embrace.
As

I

have argued, there are several good reasons for expecting that

a public articulation of the inner rationality of the anti-abortionist

position would encourage sympathy for it.

And there are good reasons for

supposing that feminists and planners would, on reflection, admit that

many of their beliefs about abortion, family life and liberalism would
be destructive of the liberal ideal if not supported in practice by

beliefs central to traditional ways of life.

Ideally, feminists and

planners would come to understand how, in their arguments for abortion,
badly
they have illicitly universalized their own ways of life and have
as
misinterpreted important aspects of the anti-abortion movement

consequence

a

So, in addition to widespread agreement that a state
policy on

contraception and abortion is essential, and some possible grounds for

promoting compromise, we need to ask if participants are willing and able
to respect each other's positions enough to grant them the minimal
amount

of legitimacy which would be essential to a compromise, and then to ask
if the state could fashion a compromise which would accord each some

legitimacy while addressing its own needs.
The possibility for compromise requires some speculation, most

importantly because the anti-abortionist position is so narrowly

defined and insufficiently articulated.

But the speculation can be con-

trolled by exploring the way a reasonably similar society, like France,
has handled the compromise

,

and by setting out the existing evidence

for supposing that a compromise is not out of the question.
To begin, the fact that several prominent American pro-abortionists

have changed their positions bodes well for a compromise.

And the fact

that their sympathies were broadened by more attention to the issues of
fetal personhood and the legitimate state limits on personal rights, en-

courages my suspicions that these two concerns will provide the dimensions
of a compromise.
It is more difficult to gauge the willingness of anti-abortionists

to embrace a compromise which would give ascendant rights to the mother

over her unborn child and over her spouse.

The gross misinterpretation

of the anti-abortionist position by pro-abortionists and the media has

encouraged a hostility toward compromise by at least some anti-abortionists.

comBut some prominent spokespeople are arguing that a political

wanton.
promise is probably the most promising route toward ending the
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if not all, destruction of unborn human life.

Joseph Sobran, one of the most prominent non-Catholic
anti-

abortionists, argues that given the obstacles which the
anti-abortionists
face, their most promising political move is toward establishing
the

principle that abortion is wrong and hope that in time this will "dispose
men's minds toward the acceptance of abortion in the long run."

Sobran

believes that laws can educate the citizenry, and that the public, legal

acknowledgment of the personhood of the fetus, at some future point in
time, might discourage, at least, the use of abortion as a contraceptive

of first resort.
And Paul Ramsey, a scholar from Princeton who has written extensively
on abortion, is arguing that even amidst deep hostility toward anti-

abortionists, there are some grounds for compromise.

Ramsey is pressing

for laws, in the spirit of Roe v. Wade, which would charge doctors with

equal care of potentially viable fetuses whether or not they are the

products of induced abortions

.

More specifically, Ramsey is arguing that

the states mandate the use of prostaglandins in induced abortions, as

they tend to produce more live infants than in the saline induced

abortions most commonly performed now.

Ramsey suggests that even though

the Supreme Court is interested only in the health of the mother

,

its

1973 decisions leave some leeway for state laws aimed at protecting the

older aborted fetuses.

This would be in keeping, moreover, with the

position of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists which
has always maintained that the primary purpose of abortions is not to kill
the fetus.

2

The willingness of both Sobran and Ramsey to consider seriously

.
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compromises at odds with their personal convictions
suggests that many

other anti-abortionists might be able to support a
state-sponsored
compromise.

My experiences with working class women
suggest that they

would be willing to support a compromise which is geared
toward the protection of the unborn and the traditional family.
Although the specifics of a compromise which could command broad
support would be dependent upon reactions about which we can only

hazard a guess, the French abortion laws might serve as a model for our
own compromise.

3

.

The French Abortion Compromise

The French abortion laws are designed to "respect life, assist

women in physical danger, provide every woman with optimum conditions
for keeping her child, and allow individuals and doctors freedom of

conscxence

..3

The law guarantees the respect of every human being
from the beginning of life. There shall be no infringement of this principle except in case of necessity and
according to the conditions defined by present law."^
The emphasis on respect for life "from the beginning" sets the moral
tone of French abortion legislation.

All parties to the abortion con-

troversy in France agree that the unborn fetus is a human being from
the moment of conception, and that the decision to abort is a moral

decision.
The laws are designed to allow only those women to abort for whom

carrying the pregnancy to term would be an "unbearable distress."
Though in the last analysis, the choice for abortion is the pregnant
woman's, she must follow a set of procedures designed to make abortion
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the least attractive option.

She must, first of all, approach a physician,
who must:
1.

Inform her of the medical risks she runs for herself
and for

her future pregnancies.
2.

Deliver to the woman a dossier containing:
a.

A list of the rights, assistance, and advantages

guaranteed by the Family Law to mothers, unmarried or not, and to
their children, as well as the possibilities offered by the adoption
of a baby to be born.
b.

A list of organizations which can give her additional

counseling.
The woman must then consult an "information, consultation, or family

counseling service, or center for family planning or education, a social
service or other approved organization which is to issue her an attestation of the consultation."^
This consultation includes a private interview in the course of which

aid and advice appropriate to the situation of the woman concerned is

provided for her, in addition to the necessary resources for resolving
the social problems faced.

Wherever possible, couples are encouraged

to participate in the decision to be made.
3.

If the woman,

following these consultations, renews her request

for an abortion, the physician requests a written confirmation no sooner

than one week after the woman's first request.
4.

Finally, if the woman is an unmarried minor, the consent of

one of the persons exercising parental authority, or the legal guardian,
is required.
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The abortion must be performed by the tenth week
of pregnancy.

There is some hostility in France toward this compromise.

There are those,

for example, who oppose the public funding of the
abortions.

Others

think the restrictions are too strict, while some argue
that they are
too liberal.

Most agree that the laws have had the intended effect

of restricting abortions.

A compromise based on the French model would be likely to meet more
resistance in the United States.
First of all, abortion is a lucrative business here.

The French

effectively prevented this by restricting the performance of abortions
to public and private hospitals.

But, if Bernard Nathanson's accounts

of the greed he encountered by most of those involved in abortion clinics
is any evidence, we can expect strong opposition to such a compromise by

pharmaceutical companies and the owners and operators of abortion clinics.
Second, the Supreme Court's decision that the early fetus is not a

person with rights makes the acceptance of a proposal featuring the
respect for the early fetus, more difficult to cultivate than it was in
France.

Although all parties to the American controversy act implicitly

as if the fetus is a person worthy of respect, most feminists and liberals

will not embrace this publicly.
There are, as
and feminists could

I

have argued, reasons for maintaining that liberals
and'

should agree to support laws which stress the

moral impact of the decision to abort.
The willingness and ability of all participants to compromise could

be enhanced by a re-opening of dialogue between the parties with a con-

centration on the issues of fetal personhood and the family.

It is
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essential that the anti-abortion position be presented
as part of
ticular way of life, and not, restrictively

,

a par-

as a set of religious

beliefs

4.

The Role of the State

The final important factor in a compromise is, of course, the

state itself, and the fact that it is already well-insinuated in American
family life.

Our welfare state assist mothers without other means of

support, pays for some abortions, and shapes family policy in general.

Many anti-abortionists have argued that the state's interference
in family life weakens it, and that this is particularly true of current

abortion policy.

A key goal for anti-abortionists is a withdrawal of the

state from its overwhelming influence in family life.
Allan Carlson, writing in support of this view, charges that recent

efforts by the state, in a variety of contexts, to strengthen the family
have had the opposite effect.
to strengthen the family,

Lewis Coser's study on Stalin's attempts

for example, concluded that his very inter-

ference in family affairs undermined parental authority.

And recent

research on the effects of Sweden's marriage-loan act, intended to

encourage earlier marriage and more children per family, actually produced families with fewer children than in those families not helped
by the state.
And while defensive explanation abound, the fact remains
that the U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare
experiments with income-maintenance programs have seen
divorce, separation, and desertion figures significantly
higher than among control families receiving no benefits.
The disconcerting reality appears to be that state social
intervention on behalf of families actually weakens or
destroys families

•
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But even if the anti-abortionists were able to make their case

against state intervention per se

,

it might still be the case that, at

this point, the state could not withdraw from all its functions in family
life without causing serious dislocations anti-abortionists would not,

on reflection, support.
For many anti-abortionists who call for a diminished state presence
in family life miss the extent to which some families are dependent upon
it for those resources traditional families are able to provide for

themselves.

Many women cannot rely on faithful and dependable spouses

and extended families to help them rear their children.

Many pregnant teenagers have neither the traditional moral parental

support to guide them in their sexual experiences nor the parental

support to help them carry their pregnancies to term.

In many ways,

the way of life which anti-abortionists celebrate is in eclipse; and

should the state relinquish its support of many who look to it for
assistance, there would be no other institution (most particularly, the

traditional family) to assist most of them.
Unless most anti-abortionists were willing to concede that the
state is already well insinuated in the family life and that its abrupt

withdrawal could hurt our weakest citizens, it is unlikely that
promise could be fashioned which would receive broad support.

a com-

But it

willing
is quite conceivable that anti-abortionists would be able and
to support measures which, while recognizing the immediate need of

state assistance to families and communities which are relatively
of their
stable and intact, and at reviewing public policies in light

consequences for traditional family life.

Ill

It might be argued,

for example, that proposed public housing

projects which disrupt community and neighborhood life, or employment
policies which require workers to accept positions involving frequent,
distant moves, be criticized, revised, perhaps shelved, in light of
their effect on strong family life.
The state's ability to fashion a compromise is shaped in part by
its commitment to assist families, by its liberal notion of what con-

stitutes a family, and by the fact that these have encouraged ways of
family life which could not exist now without state support.

The most

promising compromise, in my view, would be one which recognized the legitimacy of traditional (e.g., working class)

families and which gave their

continued existence some priority, while not immediately abandoning its
commitment to support a wide spectrum of groupings identifying themselves as families.
There are good reasons for believing that a compromise modelled

after the French compromise and with acknowledgment of the legitimacy
of traditional family life, could, in time, win broad support.

Feminists and planners would have to reason to support it because
it would acknowledge the personhood of the fetus while also recognizing

that the final decision to abort must be the pregnant woman's.

And

the compromise would insist that since the right to decide belongs

equally to all women, no woman would be denied the right to abort

because she could not afford this procedure.

The state would have to

abort.
provide public funding for women who cannot otherwise afford to

be able to
The compromise is one which working class people should

importance of
tolerate, if not celebrate, because it is based on the

112

respect for the unborn and for traditional family life.

It is struc-

tured to eliminate, as much as possible, frivolous abortions,
and to

encourage women (with substantial support from public and private
agencies when needed) to carry their pregnancies to term.

Finally, the

provisions require that unmarried minors seek the consent and, presumably,
moral guidance of their families.
The compromise would, of course, require the funding of medicaid

abortions.

But the rationale for providing the funding would be that

this was a choice of last resort and a serious moral choice, thus, ideally

accentuating the importance of the unborn child.

This is in contrast

to current claims by feminists that the state must fund abortions merely

because it cannot discriminate against the poor.
Ideally, the compromise would restrict the use of abortion as a

contraceptive of first resort; and would promote laws charging physicians
with equal care of fetuses born alive, whether or not they were the

products of induced abortions.
Obviously, a compromise which discourages abortion requires that

provisions be made for those women, unsupported by others, who choose to
carry their pregnancies to term.
There are many private agencies which are able to provide these
services, and we can expect them to be given increased support from
the private sector should such a compromise be accepted.

But, at least

for the immediate future, we would have to expect the continuance of

government assistance, like AFDC, for those women with no other means
of supporting their children.
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5

In my dissertation,

I

.

Conclusions

have argued that there are good reasons for

most participants in the abortion controversy to
try to compromise; and
that there is sufficient raw material for a morally
informed political

compromise
I

have argued that the most formidable obstacle to a settlement

has been a misreading of the intentions and a strength of
their

opponents by the pro-abortionists.
Most feminists and planners have assumed that the anti-abortion

movement is comprised for the most part, of a small but powerful group
of men who feel threatened by the freedom of abortion-on-demand gives

women
Most recent research suggests, instead, that the movement is com-

prised of men and women from many religions and backgrounds.
importantly, in terms of effect

,

But, most

the anti-abortion movement is supported

by most working class people.
I

have tried to illuminate how abortion-on-demand threatens the

ideal of working class family life, and the self-understanding of working

class people in their most important relationships

-

family relationships.

Even though not all, or even perhaps most, working class people are faithful to the ideal, it is widely embraced and used as a standard to assess

conduct
The ideal cherishes family stability, and the importance of long-term,

unconditional commitments, to friends, community and family members.
The feminists and planners, who are the most vocal of the pro-

abortionists, base their support on the need for individual freedom and

.

rights, which threaten the working class ideal by
undermining parental

authority, and the ability to respect all life whatever
its stage of

development
But most feminists and planners,

I

have argued, assume implicitly,

the need for social practices such as those which encourage
durable

family and community life, which their explicit policies help to under-

mine

.

Most pro-abortionists also recognize the impossibility of drawing
a line at any

point during its growth when the fetus changes from a

non-person to a person.
The implicit side of the pro-abortionist argument has not been

illuminated because of their withdrawal from public debate following
the 1973 Supreme Court decisions.

The features, though, provide the

raw material for compromise with the anti-abortionists.
The French abortion laws could serve as a model for our compromise.

They are based, foremost, on respect for unborn life, and secondly,

though importantly, on the mother's right not to carry a distressful

pregnancy to term.
I

have argued that we can expect some obstacles to acceptance of

compromise.

a

Some feminists, for example, celebrate a way of life so

opposed to the nuclear and extended family norms and to male/female
relationships in general, that we might expect opposition to any attempts
to restrain the absolute right of women to abort, and to strengthen the

traditional family.
In addition, we can expect opposition from private abortion clinics
the
and the pharmaceutical companies who have an enormous stake in

practice of abortion.
Finally, the liberal agenda for the family would have
to be

reviewed in light of the abortion compromise to illuminate
its implicit
side.

But, there are good reasons for arguing that participants
have an

obligation at least to reopen public debate on liberal abortion laws.
The acknowledged weaknesses of the Supreme Court decisions on

abortion (acknowledged even by some pro-abortionists)

;

the increasing

momentum of the Right- to-Life movement; and the fact that an entire
way of life is being threatened by the liberal laws, are good reasons
for claiming that both the pro- and anti-abortionists have a moral obli-

gation to try to work out a compromise.

The fact that there are grounds

for such a compromise, increases the obligation.
And, as

I

have argued, since the state is already very implicated

in family life, even though its presence may well contribute toward its

weakening, a compromise will probably maintain a state presence in the
family, if not increase it in some instances.

Without state assistance, efforts to limit abortions are likely to
jeopardize most those already living on the fringes of society.
We can insist, though, that public policies be made with the effect
on family life in mind, and that, if policies do not improve that quality
of family life, at least they do not impair it.

The compromise

I

have suggested is not ideal; but we can expect,

ideally, from the compromise, a generalized respect for the unborn which

would encourage couples to contracept responsibly; that doctors treat all
fetuses with equal respect and care; and that citizens and policymakers
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be willing to formulate public policies which encourage
durable family

and civic relationships.
Finally,

I

have tried to suggest that there are reasons why some

may not want to compromise, at least not in the immediate future.

The

most striking aspect of my research has been the tremendous hostility
of pro- and anti-abortionists toward one another.

This has led more than

a few of them to suggest the impossibility of compromise.

I

could

speculate that a compromise, if it were to come about, would be years
in the making.

The misinterpretations have been so gross and the range of debate
so narrow, that the dialogue itself will have to be reshaped before the

opponents can begin to have a measure of respect for one another.
there are some reasons for expecting that this might occur.

But

Most impor-

tant among them is the fact that both prominent anti- and pro-abortionists

have suggested compromise as the morally expedient path.
The possibilities for compromise could be widened if the debate

were renewed and, particularly, if working class anti-abortionism were

expressed as part of a larger set of beliefs about the importance of
traditional family relationships.
The immediate possibilities for compromise are quite grim.

But

since there are grounds for a compromise, means for promoting it, and
the possible outcome of a more cohesive policy, there are good reasons

for insisting that a compromise be attempted.
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